Stable Randomization by Agranov, Marina et al.
Stable Randomization*
Marina Agranov† Paul J. Healy‡ Kirby Nielsen§
July 10, 2020
Abstract
We design a laboratory experiment to identify whether randomization behavior
represents a stable “type” across different choice environments. In both games
and individual choice questions, subjects face twenty simultaneous repetitions of
the same choice. Randomization constitutes making different choices across the
twenty repetitions. We find that randomization preferences are highly correlated
across domains, with a sizable fraction of individuals randomizing in all domains,
even in questions that offer a first-order stochastically dominant option. For some
mixers, dominated randomization is responsive to intervention. Our results are
inconsistent with many preference-based models of randomization, leaving open
a role for heuristics and biases.
Keywords: Randomization; Probability matching; Convex preferences; Stochastic
choice; Contingent reasoning
JEL Classification: D81, C91, D89.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many behavioral and experimental studies demonstrate significant heterogeneity. For
example, we observe heterogeneous risk preferences over lottery choices (Mosteller
and Nogee, 1951) and we observe heterogeneous levels of strategic sophistication in
*We thank Yaron Azrieli, Ryan Oprea, Pietro Ortoleva, Collin Raymond, and John Rehbeck for
helpful comments and suggestions. This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at the
Ohio State University.
†Division of Humanities & Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology; magra-
nov@hss.caltech.edu
‡Department of Economics, The Ohio State University; healy.52@osu.edu
§Division of Humanities & Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology; kirby@caltech.edu
1
games (Nagel, 1995). A natural question is whether this heterogeneity is indicative
of a stable distribution of types, or whether such types are transitory. A fairly large
literature examines stability of types within a given domain, and many papers suggest
that they are not stable (Binswanger, 1980; Crosetto and Filippin, 2016; Choi et al.,
2007; Ubfal, 2016; Georganas et al., 2015, e.g.). One possible explanation for this
instability is that behavior exhibits a fair amount of randomness, even when the
same decision is repeated (Mosteller and Nogee, 1951; Sopher and Narramore, 2000).
Indeed, Agranov and Ortoleva (2017) and Dwenger et al. (2018) document a clear
preference for randomization over lottery choices, and Feldman and Rehbeck (2019)
show that this behavior is correlated across elicitation methods. The question then
becomes, is randomization itself a stable trait? Are those who randomize in one
domain more likely to randomize in another? For example, can mixing over lottery
choices predict mixing in games?
In this paper we measure randomization in several different domains—including
lottery choices and games—and explore the cross-domain correlations of random-
ization behavior. For each decision problem in each domain, we ask the subject to
make their choice twenty times, with one of the twenty being randomly selected for
payment. In all domains we see that a substantial fraction of subjects randomize by
varying their choices over the twenty repetitions. This is true even when one option
stochastically dominates the other. More importantly, we find significant correlation
across domains. This indicates that there are “mixing types,” who have a preference
for randomizing in all of the domains, and “non-mixers,” who always pick the same
option in all twenty repetitions. We then run a treatment where subjects make the
twenty choices sequentially, learning after each whether it was paid or not. Here
we find that a sizable fraction of the mixing types no longer mix in questions with
stochastic dominance, but continue to mix when neither option dominates the other.
Thus, we identify three types: people who never mix, people who staunchly mix, and
people who mix selectively.
These results most obviously inform theories of individual decision-making, which
we discuss in Section V. But the correlation across domains suggests that we should
also consider preferences for randomization in other contexts. For example, we can
view our results as providing a foundation for non-equilibrium mixing in games.
Many game-theoretic concepts are built around the idea that players tremble, or
that they best respond with noise. Quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and
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Palfrey, 1995) is a solution concept that explicitly incorporates noisy best response.
This noise is often modeled as arising from payoff shocks or misspecifications, but
one could alternatively interpret it as reflecting deliberate randomization by players
who simply prefer to mix, as in Allen and Rehbeck (2020).1 Indeed, we find that our
mixing subjects put more weight on a lottery or strategy when its expected value
increases, consistent with the common assumption that better responses are played
more frequently (Goeree et al., 2005). Persistent mixing behavior may also explain
the fact that other traits—such as risk aversion and strategic sophistication—appear
to be unstable across decision problems (Crosetto and Filippin, 2016; Georganas et al.,
2015).
The domains we study in our experiment are (1) Probability Matching (PM) prob-
lems, which involve the choice between first-order stochastically dominating and
dominated options, (2) Risky-Safe (RS) problems, which involve choices between a
risky lottery and a sure amount, (3) Strategic Certainty Games (SC) that are isomor-
phic to the PM problems, but framed as subjects playing a game against a known
distribution of opponents’ actions, and (4) Strategic Uncertainty Games (SU) in which
subjects play a game against other participants in the current session.2
Our main treatment is the IND treatment. In each decision problem, subjects
choose between the same two options twenty times, where the twenty repetitions
correspond to twenty independent realizations of uncertainty. In particular, the
twenty choices correspond to twenty different draws of a ball from an urn, or twenty
different opponents. Subjects encounter decision problems in all four domains listed
above. We find very high rates of randomization, with nearly 70% of subjects mixing in
at least one decision problem in each domain. Correlations of mixing across domains
are also high: 52% of subjects mix in all four domains, while 17% never mix in any
domain. And almost all of those who mix do so even when one option is stochastically
dominated.3 Finally, we see that mixing responds sensibly to changes in payoff
parameters, with subjects mixing less in each domain as the difference in expected
1In a similar vein, several studies, including Crawford (1990), Dekel et al. (1991), and Azrieli and
Teper (2011), study existence of equilibrium with convex preferences.
2Playing against past participants in the SC games allows us to control subjects’ beliefs about their
opponents in the game, turning choices of actions into choices of objective lotteries. For the SU games,
we elicit subjects’ beliefs to pin down the subjective lotteries subjects face in choosing their actions.
3Of the 31% who mix in some (but not all) domains, 94% of them (or, 29% of subjects) mix over a
stochastically-dominated option at least once. Adding the 52% who mix in all domains, we have that
81% mixed at least once when mixing was stochastically dominated.
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values is increased. This provides further evidence that mixing is intentional, rather
than a thoughtless mistake or an experimenter demand effect.
In our additional treatments we explore the robustness of these mixing types. One
possibility is that they choose to mix because they incorrectly believe in negative serial
correlation in the outcomes of the twenty lottery choices, meaning that they believe
the dominated option eventually becomes “due” to pay out. Our second treatment,
CORR, eliminates this possibility by having all twenty choices pay based on one single
draw from the Bingo cage (or, the choice of one single opponent). Thus, if Option
A pays more in one choice, it will pay more in all twenty choices. Surprisingly, we
find that mixing behavior in CORR is indistinguishable from the IND treatment,
suggesting that mixing behavior cannot be rationalized by subjects having different
beliefs about the twenty replicated choices. We discuss other possible heuristics in
Section V.
In our final experiment, we further examine the robustness of mixing types by
having subjects condition on each choice as though it were the choice that will be
paid. Specifically, in the SEQ treatment we ask subjects to make their twenty choices
sequentially, learning after each replicate whether or not it is paid before moving to
the next.4 Thus, when making their twelfth choice (for example) they know that the
first eleven were not paid, and that they will not face choices thirteen through twenty
if the twelfth choice is paid. This encourages them to think of the current choice in
isolation, rather than as part of a portfolio of twenty.5 We find that the percentage
who mix in the PM questions (where one option dominates the other) drops by over
20 percentage points to around 40%, but does not change in the RS questions. This
shows that there is a mixing type that is responsive to interventions. We then ask
these same subjects to participate in the IND treatment, and find that mixing in the
PM question remains at 40%. Thus, the responsive mixers appear to learn from the
SEQ treatment that mixing is not what they prefer, and continue not to mix in our
original treatment.6
4Once subjects reveal that a particular replicate was paid they stop and move on to the next
decision problem.
5They may still view it as a portfolio consisting of the current choice and all yet-to-be made choices,
but cannot incorporate the current choice with those choices already made.
6We omit the SC and SU domains from this experiment in interest of time, since subjects had to
participate in three different treatments. Thus we cannot say whether responsive mixers would also be
responsive in game settings, or whether some staunch mixers would become responsive to the SEQ
treatment with games. Our primary goal is simply to show that such responsive types exists; finer
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In all of our experiments, we measure mixing by having subjects make the same
choice twenty times, all on one screen. We cannot say whether or by how much this
design choice influences the frequency of mixing. But the prevalence of mixing in the
literature—and the fact that mixing behavior in this study responds both to payoffs
(as Feldman and Rehbeck, 2019 also observed) and to sequential decision-making—
suggests that mixing behavior is a thoughtful response. Further, if mixing is driven by
showing subjects all choices together then one would expect less mixing if choices were
separated, but both Agranov and Ortoleva (2017) and Brown and Healy (2018) find
that mixing increases when repeated choices are separated. Obviously the magnitude
of observed mixing can be affected by the presentation of the decisions, but our results,
coupled with other evidence from the literature, suggest that mixing is both robust
and stable across domains.
Our results add a new branch to the literature on stability of behavioral types
across domains.7 Most studies on risk preferences find that they are not stable
(Binswanger, 1980; Isaac and James, 2000; Kruse and Thompson, 2003; Eckel and
Wilson, 2004; Berg et al., 2005; Anderson and Mellor, 2009; Vlaev et al., 2009; Dulleck
et al., 2015) except when the domains are very similar (Choi et al., 2007; Reynaud
and Couture, 2012; Slovic, 1972). Time preferences appear to be stable across goods
(Reuben et al., 2010; Ubfal, 2016) and across delay lengths (McLeish and Oxoby,
2007; Halevy, 2015). Most studies find fairly consistent patterns of social preferences
across settings (Fisman et al., 2007; Ackert et al., 2011; De Oliveira et al., 2012a),
though there are exceptions (Blanco et al., 2011). Cross-game correlations of strategic
sophistication seem more mixed, with high rates of correlations in some families of
games, but not others (Georganas et al., 2015).
There is a large experimental literature on randomization, most of which focuses
exclusively on a single domain. Papers have studied probability matching over
stochastically dominant and dominated lotteries (Humphreys, 1939; Grant et al.,
1951; Siegel and Goldstein, 1959; Loomes, 1998; Rubinstein, 2002), randomization
details about the interaction between responsiveness and domain are left for future research.
7A related literature studies stability over time for risk preferences (Horowitz, 1992; Hey, 2001;
Harrison et al., 2005; Dave et al., 2010; Reynaud and Couture, 2012; Crosetto and Filippin, 2016),
time preferences (Kirby, 2009; Krupka and Stephens, 2013; Meier and Sprenger, 2014), and social
preferences (Brosig et al., 2007; De Oliveira et al., 2012a,b; Lotz et al., 2013; Lönnqvist et al., 2015;
Bruhin et al., 2019). Chuang and Schechter (2015) provide a survey, concluding that experimental
measures of social and time preferences show weak intertemporal correlation, while risk preferences
exhibit zero correlation.
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in decisions that do not feature dominant options (Sopher and Narramore, 2000;
Dwenger et al., 2018; Agranov and Ortoleva, 2017; Feldman and Rehbeck, 2019;
Agranov and Ortoleva, 2020), and randomization in games (Shachat, 2002; Sandroni
et al., 2013; Romero and Rosokha, 2019).8 We contribute to this literature in several
ways. Ours is the first experiment to show within-person correlations in mixing
behavior across these different domains. We find strong evidence of “mixing types”
who randomize in all environments, and provide evidence that some of the observed
dominated mixing is responsive to intervention. Ours is also the first experiment
to study randomization behavior in games compared to their equivalent decision
problems, using these different domains to establish the breadth of mixing types.9
II. DESIGN OF INDEPENDENT EXPERIMENT
We designed our main experiment, which we refer to as the Independent (IND)
treatment, with two goals in mind. The first is to document mixing behavior in several
seemingly-unrelated domains: individual decision tasks with stochastically dominated
options, choices between objective lotteries that do not have dominance ordering, and
different types of games. The second goal is to establish whether people who choose to
mix in one domain are more likely to mix in other domains, thereby investigating the
robustness of “mixing types.”
The experiment consisted of four sessions with 21 subjects in each for a total of 84
subjects and was conducted at the Ohio State Experimental Economics Laboratory.10
We used physical randomization devices—draws from a bingo cage and rolls of dice—to
resolve all uncertainty.
Each experimental session consisted of four decision blocks, with each block com-
prising a different type of decision task. The order of blocks was randomized across
8Building on the idea of probability matching, several recent papers studied dominated diversifica-
tion behavior in financial settings (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001; Huberman and Jiang, 2006; Baltussen
and Post, 2011; Gathergood et al., 2019).
9To our knowledge, no one has shown evidence of mixing in games that cannot be rationalized. One
could argue that mixing in a repeated game is very unlikely to be an empirical best response—indeed,
Romero and Rosokha (2019) find that mixing diminishes over time—but this argument is not conclusive
without knowledge of subjects’ beliefs about their opponent’s repeated-game strategy. Our games with
strategic certainty show this, as does the use of signals in our games with strategic uncertainty.
10Subjects were recruited through ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). No subject participated in more than one
experimental session. The software was custom-built using PHP and MySQL. Subjects interacted with
the software via a web browser on private computer terminals. Sessions lasted roughly 90 minutes,
and subjects earned on average $22.41 (which includes a $5 show-up fee).
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sessions, with the only restriction being that Block IV (risk elicitation) always ap-
peared last. Instructions for each block were distributed and read out loud to subjects
before the start of the block. In addition, the experimenter used slides as a visual aid
to clarify the procedures and the tasks. We paid subjects for one randomly-selected
choice made in the experiment. First, we describe the decisions that subjects faced in
each block, and then we describe the payment procedure in detail at the end of this
section.11 Many of the choices in the experiment involve lotteries with two outcomes.
We write ($a, p;$b) to denote a lottery that pays $a with probability p and $b with
probability 1− p; ($a,1) denotes the degenerate lottery that pays $a with certainty.
Block I: Individual Decisions. This block consisted of twelve questions: six ques-
tions that involve first-order stochastically dominated options, which we refer to as
probability matching (PM) questions, and six choices between a risky lottery and a
sure amount, which we refer to as risky-safe (RS) questions. These twelve questions
were presented to subjects in random order, each question on a different screen. In
each of the twelve questions, a subject chose between the same two lotteries twenty
times, all on the same screen. In PM questions, each decision involved choosing
twenty times between a dominant bet of ($25, p;$5) with p > 1/2, and a dominated
bet, ($25,1− p;$5). In RS questions, each decision involved choosing twenty times
between a risky bet, ($25, p;$5) (again with p> 1/2), and a safe bet, ($15,1). The six
PM questions differed only in the probability associated with the dominant bet, i.e.,
p ∈ {0.55,0.60,0.65,0.70,0.75,0.80}. Similarly, the six RS questions differed only in the
probability associated with the risky bet, where p ∈ {0.55,0.60,0.65,0.70,0.75,0.80}.
We refer to these questions by their acronym and associated probability, e.g. PM55
refers to the twenty choices between ($25,0.55;$5) and ($25,0.45;$5), and RS55 refers
to the twenty choices between ($25,0.55;$5) and ($15,1).
Both RS and PM questions were presented in terms of betting on a ball drawn
from a Bingo cage. We had a Bingo cage filled with twenty balls, numbered 1–20.
Each bet specified payoffs that a subject would receive depending on which ball would
be drawn from the cage. For example, in the RS questions, choosing, say, the risky
11Subjects were told in the beginning of the session that there would be four blocks, and told
(truthfully) that their choices in one block would have no impact on decisions in any other block.
The slides are presented in the Supplementary Appendix alongside the instructions for one of the
treatments. The choice to be paid was determined at the end of the session using a draw from the
Bingo cage, and all subjects in the session were paid for the same decision.
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bet ($25,0.75;$5) indicates winning $25 if the ball drawn is numbered 1–15 and
winning $5 if the ball drawn is numbered 16–20, while choosing the safe bet ($15,1)
indicates winning $15 regardless of which ball is drawn. Similarly, in PM questions,
choosing the dominant bet ($25,0.75;$5) indicates winning $25 if the ball drawn is
numbered 1–15 and winning $5 if the ball drawn is numbered 16–20, while choosing
the dominated bet ($25,0.25;$5) indicates winning $5 if the ball drawn is numbered
1–15 and winning $25 if the ball drawn is numbered 16–20.12 Which of the twenty
bets would be chosen for payment was determined by the roll of a twenty-sided die.
Left Right
Up $25,$5 $5,$25
Down $5,$25 $25,$5
Matching Pennies
Left Right
Up $25,$15 $5,$5
Down $15,$25 $15,$15
Dominance Solvable
Table I: Matching Pennies and Dominance Solvable Games
Block II: Games with Strategic Certainty. In this block, subjects played a
Matching Pennies game twice, both times against a known distribution of past players’
actions. We reproduce the payoff matrix for the game on the left side of Figure I
above. Subjects were presented with the game form as the row player, and told that
they would be matched randomly with one of twenty column players who had played
the game in a previous session.13 We tell subjects the truthful distribution of past
players who played Left and Right. In one iteration of the game, we tell subjects that
11 of 20 (55%) previous players played LEFT, and in the other we tell them that 16
out of 20 (80%) previous players played LEFT. We refer to these games as SC55 and
SC80, respectively. While framed very differently, information about the distribution
of actions of past players creates isomorphism between these games with strategic
certainty and two of the PM questions from Block I (PM55 is isomorphic to SC55
and PM80 is isomorphic to SC80), where playing UP corresponds to choosing the
dominant bet ($25, p;$5). Subjects chose between Up and Down twenty times for both
distributions of past players.14
12Given this structure of payoffs, the dominant bet is first-order stochastically dominant but is
never state-wise dominant.
13The data for the past players was collected at University of California in Irvine in December 2017.
14We did not include Dominance Solvable games with strategic certainty, which would be equivalent
to our RS decision problems. This was because most subjects chose Left in the Dominance Solvable
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These games with strategic certainty allow us to fix subjects’ beliefs in comparing
decision problems to games. If we find differences in mixing behavior between PM and
SC questions, this suggests that the mere framing as a game affects randomization
tendencies. This might indicate that individuals do not treat uncertainty from nature
in the same way they treat uncertainty from other individuals, indicating that mixing
types are sensitive to the nature of uncertainty.
Block III: Games with Strategic Uncertainty. Subjects played two different
2× 2 matrix games, Matching Pennies and a Dominance Solvable game, against
current opponents in the room. We refer to these games as SUMP (Strategic Un-
certainty Matching Pennies) and SUDS (Strategic Uncertainty Dominance Solvable),
respectively. As described above, the Matching Pennies game is equivalent to a PM
question for a given belief of their opponent choosing LEFT. The Dominance Solvable
game is equivalent to a RS question, where choosing UP corresponds to choosing the
risky option and choosing DOWN corresponds to choosing the safe option. Subjects
played through each game in five different stages. Within each game, the stages
were presented in the order described below, and the order of the two games was
randomized across sessions.
In Stage 1, subjects played the game for a single repetition as Column player,
choosing either LEFT or RIGHT. In Stage 2, subjects played twenty repetitions of
the game as Row player, all on the same screen, just as described in Block II above.
Each of their twenty row choices could be matched with a random Column player’s
decision from Stage 1. In Stage 3, we elicit subjects’ belief that a random Column
player chose LEFT. We use these beliefs to compare games with strategic uncertainty
to their analogous Block 1 individual-choice questions.
It could be that individuals mix in these games because their beliefs are such that
they are exactly indifferent between UP and DOWN. This is especially plausible in
the Matching Pennies game.15 We address this possibility in Stages 4 and 5 by giving
subjects a noisy signal of one opponent’s play—which should cause a change in their
beliefs away from indifference—and ask them to play the game again. Specifically,
in Stage 4 subjects see a signal of one opponent’s action, LEFT or RIGHT, that is
correct 55% of the time but incorrect 45% of the time. Subjects then play another 20
game, so we could not credibly provide past distributions of play that would match RS questions.
15Given that we do not elicit subjects’ utilities, we cannot rule this out given beliefs alone.
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repetitions of the game as Row player, just as in Stage 2. If they were mixing in Stage
2 due to indifference, we should not see any mixing in Stage 4 (and vice-versa). In
Stage 5, we elicit post-signal beliefs, just as in Stage 3. We will say a subject mixes if
they mix in both Stage 2 and Stage 4.
Block IV: Risk Elicitation. Subjects complete two standard risky investment
tasks to measure their risk preferences. We endow subjects with $10, any portion of
which they could invest in a risky project. If the project is successful, which occurs
with probability p, the amount invested is multiplied by R and paid to the subject. If
the project is unsuccessful, the amount invested is lost. In either case, subjects keep
the portion of the endowment they chose not to invest. The parameters used in the
two risky investment tasks are (p= 0.5,R = 2.5) and (p= 0.4,R = 3). In both cases, a
risk-neutral or risk-seeking subject will invest all $10 in the risky investment, while
sufficiently risk averse subjects will invest less. We randomize the order of the two
investment tasks between subjects. This risk elicitation method is due to Gneezy and
Potters (1997) and is among the more popular ones to elicit risk attitudes of subjects
in laboratory experiments (see survey of Charness et al., 2013).
To summarize, subjects go through 26 decision problems during the session. 14
are individual decisions (Blocks I and IV) and the remaining 12 are game decisions
(Blocks II and III). Some of the questions have one repetition (both risk attitude
questions in Block IV and Stages 1, 3, and 5 of games with strategic uncertainty in
Block III), while all the remaining questions have twenty repetitions of the same
choice presented on the same screen.
To determine subjects’ payments, at the end of the experiment one of the questions
was randomly selected for payment (we will call it the selected question).16 The same
question was selected for all subjects in a session, but the selected question differed
between sessions. If the selected question had only one repetition, then subjects
16Each question was equally likely to be selected for payment. This payment method generates a
two-stage lottery, where the first stage is the choice of which problem is paid and the second stage is the
list of 20 lotteries chosen in that problem. Azrieli et al. (2018) show that this is incentive compatible as
long as first-stage preferences respect dominance. We do find violations of dominance in second-stage
choices, but choices there are all shown on one screen so dominance violations are consistent with
Brown and Healy (2018); dominance violations in the first stage would not be consistent with existing
evidence. Stage 1 (Column player choices) of both games in Block III has no probability of being selected
for payment, but those choices are still incentivized because a row player in Stages 2 or 4 may be paired
with this subject’s column-player choice and paid.
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were paid based on this single choice. If the selected question had twenty repetitions,
then we used the physical Bingo cage and dice to determine subjects’ payments.
Specifically, the experimenter had a transparent Bingo cage filled with twenty balls
numbered from 1 to 20. First, the experimenter drew twenty balls with replacement
and wrote these draws on the board, so that all subjects observed these draws. Each
of these draws corresponded to one of the twenty repetitions of a choice in the selected
question. After the twenty draws were recorded, the experimenter rolled a 20-sided
die to determine which of the twenty repetitions would be selected for payment. For
example, if the die came up 17 and the 17th ball drawn was ball 5, then we look at the
subject’s choice on the 17th repetition and pay the bet chosen based on ball 5 being
drawn.17 We paid all subjects for the same repetition of a question. Subjects observed
choices they submitted in the selected question during this “theatrical” performance
of the experimenter.
III. INDEPENDENT EXPERIMENT: RESULTS
Our main object of interest is the tendency of subjects to randomize their answers
across repetitions within a decision problem. This requires a definition of random-
ization at the individual level. In the analysis that follows, we identify a subject as a
mixer if they chose less than 90% of same bets in a decision problem, i.e., fewer than
18 same bets out of 20 total repetitions of the same choice. We identify a subject as
mixing in a given domain if they were a mixer in at least one of the questions in that
domain. In Appendix B, we show that while levels of mixing are obviously responsive
to this cutoff, the qualitative results remain the same.
In all regression analyses we cluster standard errors at the individual level to avoid
interdependencies of observations that come from the same subject completing several
tasks in the experiment. Bar graphs are shown with 95% confidence intervals.
17If a Strategic Uncertainty game is paid (Stages 2 and 4 of Block III) then one subject is randomly
chosen as the row player and another subject is randomly chosen as the column player, and they are
paid based on their strategy choices. Specifically, one of the row player’s 20 repetition is randomly
selected and compared to the column player’s Stage-1 choice. All other subjects are paid a flat payment
of $15. If a belief elicitation task is paid (Stages 3 and 5) then all subjects are paid according to
the BDM-for-probabilities method (Grether, 1981), which is incentive compatible as long as subjects’
preferences respect dominance; see Appendix A for details.
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III.A. Mixing Types
Our prior hypothesis was that subjects could be divided into three mutually exclusive
types based on their behavior in all domains: Subjects who do not mix in any of the
domains are called Never Mix (17% of subjects), subjects who mix in all domains are
called Always Mix (52% of subjects), and subjects who mix sometimes but never violate
first-order stochastic dominance are called Non-Dominated Mix (2% of subjects).18
Thus, the modal subject randomizes in every environment we considered.
One unexpected pattern is that 8% of subjects mix in games (SC and SU) but
not in decision problems (PM or RS). All other patterns are rare, each explaining
at most 3.6% of subjects. Overall, it is most common for subjects to always mix or
never mix. A minority of subjects mix in some environments but not in others. Thus,
randomization behavior appears to be a “type” that varies among individuals but is
generally consistent across environments.
Result 1. Randomization is an individual trait. The two most prominent types in the
population are subjects who Never Mix (17%) and those who Always Mix (52%).
To further investigate individual types, Table II presents pairwise correlations for
each pair of domains. We find that mixing is positively and significantly correlated
across all domains. We see strong correlations across different decision environments,
suggesting that individual types are robust and not solely driven by decision framing.
PM RS SC SUMP
RS 0.71∗∗∗
SC 0.52∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗
SUMP 0.58∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗
SUDS 0.42∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗
Table II: Pairwise Correlations in Individual Mixing in the IND Experiment
Notes: We report pairwise correlations between indicator variables indicating whether a subject mixed
in each of our decision environments. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1% level.
However, we do find some differences that would be interesting to explore in future
work. Individuals appear to mix more in games than in their equivalent decision
18The Non-Dominated Mix category includes, for instance, subjects who tend to mix in some of the
RS questions and games with strategic uncertainty, but never mix in PM questions.
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problems: For example, 25% of individuals who mix in SC55 do not mix in PM55
(compared to only 8% of mixers in PM55 who do not mix in SC55).19 Similarly, we
compare behavior in the SUMP decisions to those in PM questions for a subsample of
subjects for whom we are able to match these decisions (68% of subjects).20 For these
subjects, we find that they are more likely to mix in SUMP than in the corresponding
PM decision problem (68% mixers in SUMP vs. 49% in PM, signed-ranks test p <
0.001), and they choose significantly more dominated bets in SUMP than in PM (84%
dominant bets in PM vs. 70% dominant actions in SUMP, signed-ranks test p< 0.001).
We can only match SUDS to RS questions for 29% of subjects, so our comparison
sample sizes are much smaller for this game.21 These subjects are directionally more
likely to mix in SUDS than in the equivalent RS decision problem (54% mixers in
SUDS vs. 33% in RS, signed-ranks test p = 0.18), and choose more risky actions in
the SUDS than in RS (51% risky actions in SUDS vs. 36% in RS, signed-ranks test
p= 0.18).22
Result 2. Mixing is highly correlated across domains at an individual level. Further-
more, individuals are more likely to mix in games than in their equivalent individual
choice problems, for both games with strategic certainty and strategic uncertainty.
19This is similar with 51% of mixers in SC80 mixing in PM80, whereas 83% of mixers in PM80 mix
in SC80.
20To compare games with strategic uncertainty to corresponding decision problems, we match
individuals’ beliefs in SUMP (SUDS) to the corresponding objective probabilities in PM (RS) decision
problems. We can match the SUMP game for an individual with belief p(LEFT)= 0.55 or p(RIGHT)=
0.55, for example, to the PM55 question. For belief p(LEFT)=0.55, the dominant action is UP, whereas
for P(RIGHT)=0.55, the dominant action is DOWN. Both situations are isomorphic to the PM55
decision problem. In the SUDS game, an individual with belief e.g. p(LEFT)= 0.80 can be matched
with the RS80 decision problem. We focus on subjects’ beliefs after the signal, as this is where
individuals are less likely to have 50–50 beliefs in the Matching Pennies game. 26% of individuals
have 50–50 beliefs before the signal, and only 11% have 50–50 beliefs after the signal. Recall that we
consider a subject to be a mixer only if they mix both before and after the signal.
21Given that the column player has a dominant strategy, it is not surprising that we match fewer
subjects in SUDS. About 60% of subjects have a belief higher than 80%.
22Reported results are for exact matching of beliefs. If we round beliefs to the nearest 5, we can
match 77% of subjects in SUMP and 37% of subjects in SUDS. Qualitatively, the results are the same.
We find more mixers in SUMP than in the corresponding PM questions (72% in SUMP vs 52% in PM,
p< 0.001), and we find they choose more dominant bets in PM than in SUMP (82% in PM vs. 69% in
SUDS, p< 0.001. We find more mixers in SUDS than in the corresponding RS questions (58% in SUDS
vs 42% in RS, p= 0.18), and we find they choose more risky bets in SUDS than in RS (47% in SUDS vs.
35% in RS, p= 0.16).
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III.B. Variations Within A Domain
While we find that mixing is a stable type across domains, the prevalence of mixing
also responds sensibly to changes within a domain. Figure I depicts the frequency
of mixing in each question as well as overall mixing in each domain (the last four
bars on the far right part of the figure). Mixing behavior is very common in all four
domains: between 64% and 76% subjects mix in at least one question in every single
domain. The frequencies of mixing are quite similar across domains except for the
slightly higher frequency detected in the games with strategic certainty (SC).23
Within the PM domain, the chance of the dominant bet paying off ranges from
55% to 80% across questions. We observe that subjects react to this change in
probability in a monotone manner: as the dominant bet becomes “more dominant,"
individuals become less likely to mix (a Probit regression coefficient, -0.064, is negative
with p < 0.001), and those who do mix choose the dominated bet less often (linear
regression, p < 0.001). Those who mix choose the dominant bet in only 11.6 of 20
repetitions in the PM55 question, but choose it in 15.5 of 20 repetitions in PM80.24
Similar analysis for RS questions reveals that subjects react to the probability of
the risky bet paying off, which ranges in RS questions from 55% to 80%. In the most
risky question (55%) around 2/3 of subjects are non-mixers, and the vast majority
of them are choosing only the safe bet. As the risky bet becomes less risky, subjects
become more likely to mix by adding in the risky bet.25 The marginal effect on the
percentage bet variable in the Probit regression is estimated at 0.035 (p < 0.001).
Moreover, as the risky bet becomes less risky, subjects who do mix choose it more
often with an average of 6.1 out of 20 repetitions in RS55 question and 9.8 out of 20
repetitions in RS80 question.26
The fact that mixing in PM and RS domains varies with the probabilities informs
the way we think about the SC and SU games. In the SC games, most of the mixing
23We ran a Wilcoxon signed-rank test to compare frequency of mixing between each pair of domains:
p= 0.763 PM vs. RS, p= 0.018 PM vs. SC, p= 0.197 PM vs. SU, p= 0.039 RS vs. SC, p= 0.317 RS vs.
SU, and p= 0.096 for SC vs. SU
24The mixing we observe in our PM questions does not necessarily contradict the findings of Agranov
and Ortoleva (2017), who see no mixing when one lottery dominates the other state-by-state. Our
PM questions feature stochastic dominance, but not state-wise dominance; therefore, it appears that
subjects mix with stochastic dominance, but not with state-wise dominance.
25This is reminiscent of Agranov and Ortoleva (2020) who show that individuals randomize over
ranges of values.
26Regression analysis confirms this: the estimated coefficient on the percentage risky variable is
0.749 (p< 0.001).
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Figure I: Percentage of Subjects Who Randomize in Each Question or Domain
comes from SC55, in which the distribution of choices of past players is close to
uniform (76% of subjects mix in this case), while only 44% mix in SC80 in which the
distribution of past players’ choices has much smaller variance. Similarly, most of the
mixing in SU games happens in the Matching Pennies game (69% of subjects mix in
this game), while less than 40% do so in the Dominance Solvable game.27
Result 3. Randomization is highly prevalent in all domains but responds sensibly to
the available lotteries.
IV. FOLLOW-UP EXPERIMENTS
We conduct two follow-up experiments to test the robustness of mixing types along
two different dimensions. The first, our Correlated Experiment, tests whether mixing
27Statistical analysis confirms that the fraction of mixing behavior in SC55 game is significantly
higher than that in SC80 game (signed-ranks test p< 0.001). Similarly, significantly more subjects mix
in SUMP game compared with SUDS game (p< 0.001).
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types are sensitivity to the nature of uncertainty. The second, our Sequential Experi-
ment, tests whether mixing types are robust to manipulations of contingent reasoning.
We discuss our Correlated Experiment first, followed by the Sequential Experiment.
IV.A. The Correlated Experiment
One possible explanation for the “Always Mix” types observed in the IND experiment is
a “gambler’s fallacy” belief where subjects incorrectly expect negative serial correlation
across the twenty independent draws from the Bingo cage. To study whether this is
indeed what drives randomization behavior in our IND experiment, we conducted the
second experiment called the Correlated Experiment (CORR).
The CORR experiment has the exact same structure as the IND treatment including
the composition of the Bingo cage and the descriptions of all tasks. However, if the
selected question contained twenty repetitions, then instead of drawing twenty balls,
only one ball was drawn from the Bingo cage. After that, the experimenter rolled the
20-sided die to determine which repetition would be paid. That is, a subject in the
CORR experiment knew that regardless of which of their twenty bets were chosen for
payment, they would all pay out against the exact same ball drawn from the Bingo
cage.
Therefore, the IND and CORR treatments were identical except for the realizations
of uncertainty. In the IND experiment, each of the subject’s twenty decisions corre-
sponded to a different independent realization of uncertainty. This means that the
ex-post optimal bet could differ across the twenty decisions. In the CORR experiment,
however, each decision corresponded to the same single realization of uncertainty. This
means that the ex-post optimal bet is the same for all twenty decisions by construction.
Thus, the CORR treatment minimizes potential misconception that subjects might
have about serial auto correlation between realizations of uncertainty. For example,
subjects in the IND experiment could believe a high numbered ball is “due” after a
low numbered ball, which might cause them to alternate which bets they chose. In
the CORR experiment, however, only one ball is chosen, so subjects should not hold
such a belief. If this is indeed the underlying reason for mixing behavior in any of the
domains, then we expect to see less mixing in CORR than in the IND Experiment.
84 new subjects participated in the CORR experiment, which was also conducted at
the Ohio State Experimental Economics Laboratory.
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IV.A.1. Correlated Experiment Results
IND Experiment CORR Experiment
Never Mix 17% 13%
Always Mix 52% 45%
Non-Dominated Mix 2% 11%
Others 29% 31%
# of subjects 84 84
Table III: Individual Types in the IND and CORR Experiments
The classification of subjects into individual types yields similar results to those
obtained in the IND Experiment (summarized in Table III). The two most prevalent
types remain subjects who mix in all domains (45% in the CORR experiment) and
those who never mix (13% in the CORR experiment).28 The Fisher exact test and the
chi-squared test comparing the distribution of types in the IND and CORR treatments
show that these distributions are not statistically different (p= 0.15). Therefore, it
appears that the nature of uncertainty does not affect subjects’ mixing type.
Furthermore, we find that this correlated uncertainty does not affect mixing behav-
ior in any of our domains. Figure II compares the frequency of mixing in the IND and
CORR experiments within each domain. We find no significant differences (p> 0.51
for all pairwise domain comparisons, p> 0.27 for question-specific comparisons).
Therefore, incorrect belief in serial correlation is not the driving force of mixing
behavior, nor a determinant of subjects’ mixing type. Regardless of whether the
realization of uncertainty happens twenty times independently (as in the IND Experi-
ment), or once for all twenty choice (as in CORR Experiment), individuals mix to the
same extent. This also allows us to rule out a number of potential explanations for
randomization behavior, as we discuss in Section V.
Result 4. Mixing types are robust to correlated realizations of uncertainty, suggesting
that mixing behavior is not driven by a mistaken belief in the negative serial correlation
in draws.
Given that in both IND and CORR experiments the largest group of subjects tends
to mix in all domains, we ask whether mixing is indeed subjects’ true preference or
28Of the remaining subjects, we can identify two predominant patterns. 10% of subjects mix in
all the decision environments except for games with strategic uncertainty. 11% mix in all decision
environments except for RS questions.
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Figure II: Mixing Behavior in the IND and CORR Experiments
can be attributed to some confusion or wrongly applied heuristic of behavior which
subjects are happy to abandon once they realize the mistake. To make progress
in this direction, we conduct the second follow-up experiment, in which we focus
specifically on individual decision problems studied in the IND experiment (probability
matching and risky-safe questions) and stress-test them in a new experiment, called
the Sequential Experiment.
IV.B. The Sequential Experiment
The Sequential Experiment investigates whether mixing in the PM and RS questions
is driven, in part, by a failure of contingent reasoning (Esponda and Vespa, 2019, e.g.).
While individuals might be able to recognize dominance in a single decision, they
might fail to think contingently when answering the same question multiple times. We
conjecture that individuals will be more likely to choose all dominant bets when they
are encouraged to treat each of the twenty choice repetitions “in isolation,” which will
affect our individuals classified as “always mix” types. In the RS questions, however,
treating each decision in isolation need not result in less mixing as the subject might
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not clearly prefer one option over another. Thus, our Sequential Experiment tests the
robustness of mixing types to an environment that encourages contingent reasoning
and isolation of each choice.
IV.B.1. Design of Sequential Experiment
The Sequential experiment consists of three within-subject treatments: Sequential
(SEQ), Simultaneous (SIM), and One (ONE). Subjects first participate in the SEQ
block, then in the SIM block, and then in the ONE block. In each block, subjects face
the same twelve questions (six PM and six RS) as in the IND experiment, presented
in random order.
The goal of the SEQ treatment is to encourage subjects to treat each of the twenty
repetitions as a single unique choice. At the beginning of each decision problem,
the computer randomly selected which of the twenty repetitions would be the one
chosen for payment if that decision problem were selected. Subjects made their
choice in each of the repetitions sequentially. After each decision was recorded, a
subject learned whether that repetition was the one chosen for payment. If it was
not, the subject moved onto the next repetition. If it was, the decision problem
terminated and the subject moved on to the next decision problem without answering
the remaining repetitions.29 This treatment encouraged subjects to treat each of the
twenty repetitions as if it were the only choice to be made. While making their current
decision, subjects knew that any previous repetitions certainly would not be paid, so
the current choice was made in isolation.
The second environment was the Simultaneous (SIM) treatment, which was exactly
the same as our IND Experiment; that is, subjects made twenty choices simultaneously
in each decision problem. The only difference between the SIM treatment and the IND
Experiment was that subjects in the SIM treatment just previously had participated
in the SEQ treatment. If they “learned” contingent reasoning by participating in the
SEQ treatment, we could see less mixing in SIM than in the IND Experiment.
29For example, imagine the computer selected the sixth repetition as the one chosen for payment.
The subject makes their choice on the first repetition, then learns this was not the one chosen for
payment. Then they make their choice on the second repetition, and again learns it was not chosen for
payment, and so on. After making their choice on the sixth repetition, they learn that this was the
one chosen for payment. Then, the subject moves onto the next decision screen and never answers
repetitions seven through twenty. As the subject makes each of these sequential decisions, they sees all
twenty repetitions on their screen as before, but the subsequent repetitions are greyed out until they
actually makes the decision.
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The last environment was the ONE treatment, where individuals made each binary
choice only one time. Subjects saw each of the PM and RS questions in random
order and chose their preferred bet one time for each question. They only saw one
choice repetition on their screens for each question. The goal of this treatment
was to establish individuals’ “isolated” preference on a given decision problem. We
expected that most individuals would choose the dominant bet in all PM questions,
but would choose either the risky or safe option in RS questions according to their
risk preferences.
We also conducted Sequential Experiment at the Ohio State University Experimen-
tal Economics Laboratory with 93 new participants.
IV.B.2. Sequential Experiment Results
The behavior in the ONE treatment confirms our expectations: When subjects are
asked to make only one choice between the dominant and the dominated bets in the
PM questions, they almost always pick the dominant one. At the same time, when
subjects make only one choice between the risky and the safe bet in the RS questions,
their choice responds sensibly to the probability of getting a high prize in the risky
bet. Table IV makes this point by showing that more than 90% of subjects in the PM
questions in ONE treatment select the dominant bet irrespective of the likelihood of
getting the high prize in this dominant bet, while the fraction of subjects who choose
the risky lottery in the RS questions increases monotonically as the risky lottery
becomes more and more attractive.
Probability of Bet
55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80%
ONE
% Dominant (PM) 91% 94% 98% 98% 99% 98%
% Risky (RS) 11% 19% 25% 45% 57% 75%
Table IV: Subjects’ Choices in the ONE Treatment
In the Appendix, we confirm that the behavior in ONE cannot be rationalized by
the behavior in our other treatments. If we take the mixing frequencies observed by
each subject in the IND treatment and use that to predict the overall frequency of
choices in the ONE treatment, we find that the two are inconsistent: the population
of subjects in ONE mixes less than that in IND.
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Result 5. When faced with a single repetition of PM questions, subjects almost always
choose the dominant bet. When subjects face RS questions once, they are more likely to
choose the risky bet as it becomes more attractive relative to the safe bet. This behavior
is not well explained by mixing frequencies in either the SIM or IND treatments.
Given that subjects choose the dominant bet in the single PM decision but do not
choose it in each of twenty repetitions in the IND Experiment, we turn to the SEQ
treatment and ask whether it helps subjects view each of the repetitions in isolation,
and, as a result, whether it reduces mixing. Moreover, since the SIM block was
played right after the SEQ block, we investigate whether there are spill-over effects
between the SEQ and the SIM blocks. Figure III depicts the percentage of subjects
who randomize in the SEQ and SIM treatments and compares these fractions to the
IND Experiment.30 We find that for PM questions, individuals mix less in both the
SEQ and the SIM treatments compared with the IND treatment. The reduction in
mixing is statistically significant and large in magnitude: the fraction of subjects
identified as mixers falls from 64% in the IND experiment to 41% and 45% in the SEQ
and SIM treatments, respectively (p= 0.0019 IND vs. SEQ, p= 0.0110 IND vs. SIM).
However, there are no significant differences in tendency to mix in either the SEQ or
SIM treatments in the RS questions as compared with the IND experiment (p= 0.57
IND vs. SEQ, p= 0.25 IND vs. SIM).
This suggests that the sequential treatment, which eliminates the need for contin-
gent reasoning by design, affects the two types of questions differently—encouraging
contingent thinking reduces mixing when mixing is strictly dominated, but it has no
effect on mixing when mixing is not dominated.31 This has implications for identi-
30Given the structure of the SEQ treatment, individuals do not answer all twenty repetitions of a
given choice. Therefore, one might worry that the reduction in mixing is an artifact of this “truncation,”
where individuals might have mixed had they been given the opportunity to answer more repetitions.
To control for this, we identify the position of the average first less-likely bet in the IND treatment.
For PM questions, the less-likely bet is always the dominated bet, so we look to see the average first
appearance of the dominated bet in a given decision problem. For RS questions, the less-likely bet is
the risky bet for low probabilities of the high payoff and is the safe bet for high probabilities of the high
payoff. For each question, we identify the less-likely bet and the average first appearance of this bet.
We look only at sequences in the SEQ treatment where individuals answered more repetitions than
this average first less-likely bet. Figure VI in the Appendix shows that the results are essentially the
same if one looks at the overall data without truncation.
31See Martínez-Marquina et al. (2019) and literature surveyed there for evidence that people
have pervasive difficulties with contingent reasoning. They also find, using a different experimental
manipulation, that eliminating the need for contingent reasoning decreases probability matching
behavior.
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fying the source of mixing in the two types of problems. The significant reduction
in mixing in PM-type questions suggests that high mixing frequencies observed in
the IND treatment come, at least in part, from the failure of subjects to think about
possible contingencies they may face in the future regarding which repetition would
be selected for payment. At the same time, since mixing probabilities remain the
same in the SEQ, SIM, and IND treatments for RS-type of questions, this suggests
that the desire of subjects to randomize in RS-type questions is the manifestation of
true underlying preferences. Thus, while both types of mixing were highly prevalent
in the IND Experiment, and are highly correlated at an individual-level, they seem to
stem, in part, from different sources.
Figure III: Mixing Behavior in IND, SEQ, and SIM Experiments for Long Sequences
Given that individuals mix less in the PM questions, this results in a significantly
different type classification of subjects. Since we do not have games in the Sequential
Experiment, we re-classify subjects as “Never Mix” if they do not mix in PM or RS
questions, “Always Mix” if they mix in both PM and RS, and “Non-Dominated Mix” if
they mix only in RS questions. We find significant differences in the type classification
of subjects in SEQ and SIM compared to our IND experiment (Fisher’s exact test,
IND vs. SEQ p = 0.032, IND vs. SIM p = 0.020). This results from an increase
in Non-Dominated Mix subjects replacing a significant portion of the Always Mix
subjects.
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IND CORR SEQ SIM
Never Mix 29% 20% 27% 35%
Always Mix 58% 56% 46% 38%
Non-Dominated Mix 7% 11% 23% 19%
Others 6% 13% 4% 8%
# of subjects 84 84 93 93
Table V: Individual Types in All Experiments
Result 6. When decisions are sequential, mixing in the PM-type questions is reduced
for some, but not all, mixers. Mixing in the RS-type questions, however, is not reduced.
V. THEORIES OF RANDOMIZATION
In this section we review theories and heuristics that might explain the behavior of
the mixing types we observe. A more complete and formal analysis of the theories we
consider appears in Appendix C.
V.A. Preferences Over Reduced Lotteries
Mixing in our experiment generates a two-stage lottery that can be reduced to a
simple lottery in the simplex. Here we explore whether observed behavior can be
rationalized by a preference relation over these reduced lotteries.
The first important observation is that mixing represents a convex combination of
lotteries, so a strict preference for mixing reveals that preferences must be convex.
A large percentage of our subjects never mix, and are therefore consistent with
expected utility maximization. But many do mix, and this rules out not only expected
utility, but also any model that satisfies the betweenness axiom (Dekel, 1986; Chew,
1989).32 Examples of models satisfying betweenness include weighted utility theory
(Chew, 1983), implicit expected utility (Dekel, 1986), skew-symmetric bilinear utility
(Fishburn, 1988), Epstein-Zin preferences (Epstein and Zin, 1989), suspicious expected
utility (Bordley and Hazen, 1991), and disappointment aversion (Gul, 1991). For other
violations of betweenness, see the experiment and survey of Camerer and Ho (1994).
In addition to convexity, rationalizing preferences for subjects who mix in PM
32Betweenness says that if p∼ q then αp+ (1−α)q∼ p, giving linear indifference curves. It appears
in Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) as axioms 3:B:a and 3:B:b.
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questions must also allow for violations of stochastic dominance. This rules out an-
other large class of models, including prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979),
cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), rank-dependent expected
utility (Quiggin, 1982), quadratic utility (Chew et al., 1991), cautious expected utility
(Cerreia-Vioglio et al., 2015), and deliberate randomization (Cerreia-Vioglio et al.,
2019). Regret-averse preferences (Loomes and Sugden, 1982), though intransitive,
are also ruled out by dominated mixing.
One simple model of convex preferences that does allow for dominance violations is
probability weighting, where a (reduced compound) lottery p is evaluated according
to
∑
x w(p(x))u(x) for some onto and increasing weighting function w : [0,1]→ [0,1].33
If w(·) is chosen appropriately, this model can predict mixing in both PM and RS
questions, though we find that the required shape of w(·) needed to fit our data is
quite inconsistent with previous estimates of the weighting function; see Appendix C
for details.
There is, however, an even more fundamental challenge to any rationalizing model
that assumes reduction, such as the probability weighting theory above: our subjects
who mix violate the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom (IIA, or Property α
from Sen, 1969), which is well-known to be necessary for preference maximization.
When lotteries are reduced, our PM questions offer menus of lotteries that are nested,
which allows us to test IIA. For example, by mixing in PM80 a subject can achieve an
overall probability of $25 anywhere in the range [0.20,0.80], while in PM75 they can
only achieve probabilities of $25 in the smaller range [0.25,0.75]. These ranges for
all six PM questions are shown in Figure IV, along with observed choice frequencies.
If a subject’s choice in PM80 gives a 60% probability of $25, for example, then IIA
requires that their choice in PM75 also gives a 60% probability of $25. The data
shown in Figure IV, however, strongly suggests that subjects do not pick the same
reduced lottery across nested problems. Subjects who never mix or mix with low
frequencies vacuously satisfy IIA, but among those cases where we can test for IIA
we find violations in 82% of pairwise comparisons.34 Thus, the mixing behavior we
33Probability weighting is one component of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), though
prospect theory includes an editing phase that explicitly rules out the choice of dominated lotteries.
Models that apply weights to cumulative probabilities—such as rank-dependent utility (Quiggin, 1982)
and cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992)—also respect dominance.
34For any given subject there are 15 possible comparisons between two nested PM questions, and
IIA is vacuously satisfied on all 15 for 48% of subjects. For the remainder, IIA is testable in an average
of 6.11 pairwise comparisons. Actual choices are restricted to grids of 21 points in these ranges. We say
24
Figure IV: Frequencies of overall Pr($25) chosen by subjects in each PM question.
observe is inconsistent with preference maximization over reduced lotteries.
We also view our data as inconsistent with random utility models for two reasons.
First, as Agranov and Ortoleva (2017) argue, it seems implausible that subjects
experience different utility shocks across identical decisions that are made only
seconds apart. Second, we show in Appendix B that mixing frequencies in the ONE
treatment are significantly lower than in the IND or SIM treatments, whereas a
random utility model would predict them to be identical.
V.B. Preferences Over Two-Stage Lotteries
Now we explore whether mixing can be rationalized by a preference over two-stage
lotteries that does not respect reduction. In the language of Segal (1990), mixing
in PM questions violates the two-stage stochastic dominance axiom.35 But, more
IIA is satisfied if the subject chooses the point on the smaller-range grid that is closest to the point
chosen on the larger-range grid, in terms of Pr($25).
35See Segal (1990) for a general definition. In our setting, if p dominates q, and if A and B are two-
stage lotteries with support {p, q}, then A two-stage dominates B if it pays p with a higher probability
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generally, mixing on any problem violates the compound independence axiom, which
rules out models that assume independence in the first stage. This includes recursive
expected utility (Kreps and Porteus, 1978; Klibanoff and Ozdenoren, 2007) and models
of second-order expected utility (Klibanoff et al., 2005; Ergin and Gul, 2009; Seo,
2009).
One way to accommodate the mixing types we observe is to apply a preference for
randomization in the first stage. For example, a perturbed utility model posits that the
decision maker chooses a mixture p that maximizes expected utility plus a (typically
convex) function V (p) (Machina, 1985; Fudenberg et al., 2015). One interpretation is
that V (p) captures the cost of attention or the disutility of effort needed to identify
the more-preferred option (Mattsson and Weibull, 2002). An obvious way to apply this
concept to two-stage lotteries without reduction is to model the decision maker has
having a utility value U(p) for each second-stage lottery p, and choosing the two-stage
lottery P that maximizes
∑
p P(p)U(p)+V (P). This is exactly the approach of Allen
and Rehbeck (2019), who make no assumptions on U(p). Siegel (1961) proposes a
specific perturbed utility model for two-stage lotteries. In his model U(p) is simply
the expected value of p, and V (P) rewards variance in P.36
Allen and Rehbeck (2019) provide a revealed-preference test of perturbed utility
models of this form that applies easily to our RS questions. Recall that the risky
alternative in RS75 pays $25 for balls 1–15, while the risky alternative in RS80 pays
$25 for balls 1–16. If we assume U(·) gives a higher value to the latter, then the
Allen and Rehbeck (2019) condition is that the subject must pick the risky alternative
more frequently in RS80 than in RS75. Indeed, this must be true for any pair of RS
questions, and there are 15 possible such comparisons. Subjects who never mix satisfy
this condition in all 15 comparisons. Of the 65% whom we classify as mixers in the RS
domain, however, only 18% satisfy the condition in all 15 comparisons. But, among all
mixers, the average number of failures per person (out of 15) is only 2.67, and the vast
majority of those are in adjacent RS questions (for example, RS75 vs. RS80).37 Thus,
while we don’t see perfect support, a model of preferences for first-stage randomization
than does B. In this setting two-stage dominance is equivalent to Segal’s weak and strong compound
dominance.
36Siegel’s model also allows for U(p) to give a higher marginal utility to the less-likely outcome, but
this is not instrumental in predicting mixing.
37Results in the SEQ treatment are similar: Of the 68% who are mixers (classified as such regardless
of the number of replicates faced), only 16% satisfy the condition on all 15 comparisons, but the average
number of failures per person is only 3.44.
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without reduction fits the behavior of our mixing types reasonably well.38
V.C. Mistakes, Biases, and Heuristics
While a preference for first-stage randomization can explain many of those who mix
in all situations, it seems unable to explain the type of subject who mixes in IND
but not in SEQ. For these subjects, mixing appears to be a mistake or heuristic that
is overturned when decisions are made sequentially. Here we review a variety of
plausible heuristics and biases that can lead to randomization behavior.
One well-known bias that can predict mixing is the gambler’s fallacy: subjects
wrongly believe that draws from the bingo cage exhibit negative serial correlation
(Rabin and Vayanos, 2010, e.g.).39 For example, a subject who has chosen the dominant
bet in a PM problem a few times in a row—and believes those bets are likely to pay
off—might think that the dominated bet is now “due” to pay off, leading them to switch
the dominated bet.40 Indeed, we show in Appendix C that if the belief in correlation is
high enough then the optimal strategy is to alternate between bets across replications.
In the CORR treatment, however, there is only one draw from the bingo cage, so there
is no way for negative correlation to affect betting behavior: a subject who believes
the dominant bet is the better bet must believe this on all twenty replications. Yet
we still find significant mixing behavior, so a simple gambler’s fallacy story cannot
explain our data.41
Motivated by the law of small numbers (Tversky and Kahneman, 1971; Rabin, 2002)
we also consider a theory which we call the “modal count heuristic.” According to this
theory, a subject in PM60, for example, correctly identifies that the modal number of
times the dominant bet will pay off is twelve out of twenty. Based on this, they choose
the dominant bet twelve times. Their mistake is in failing to realize that they are
38The fact that mixing frequencies are lower in ONE suggests that subjects are not “flipping a coin
in their head” to randomize in ONE. Thus, we must view V (P) as applying only to external choices, not
internal randomization.
39We show in the appendix that a model in which subjects believe draws are with replacement, as
in Rabin (2002), cannot explain the mixing we observe.
40Normally this fallacy is documented when decision makers receive feedback after each decision,
as in Clotfelter and Cook (1993). Here we posit that it also holds for unrealized sequences of draws.
41It is possible that subjects in the CORR treatment have an incorrect belief that which ball is
drawn from the bingo cage can depend on which replicate is chosen for payment. This would allow
them to imagine different balls being drawn on different replicates, and, therefore, could allow for
the gambler’s fallacy. Given that we used physical randomizing devices, however, we view this as
implausible.
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unlikely to predict which twelve replicates are the ones that will pay off. While this
mistake can explain mixing in the IND treatment, it cannot explain mixing in the
CORR treatment because there the dominant bet either pays off twenty times or zero
times.
Another theory (which we develop more completely in the appendix) is one of regret
with a convex cost of “mistakes.” Consider a PM decision problem in the CORR
treatment in which the subject chooses the dominant bet in all twenty replications. If
the realized draw is such that the dominated bet was the better bet then, ex-post, this
subject has made twenty “mistakes.” If the subject has a convex cost of such mistakes,
and ex-ante makes decisions accounting for their expected cost of mistakes, then their
optimal strategy may not be to choose the dominant bet in all twenty replications.
Instead, they may prefer to mix in the dominated bet in order to reduce the number
of mistakes they would make in each state of the world. Thus, this theory predicts
mixing in the CORR treatment. In the IND treatment, however, every time the subject
chooses the dominated bet they increase the probability of making a mistake on that
replicate, without affecting their probabilities of mistakes on other replicates. Since
the expected cost of mistakes always increases by choosing the dominated bet, this
theory cannot explain mixing in the IND treatment.
Dwenger et al. (2018) propose a similar model of responsibility aversion, where the
subject uses mixing to avoid being responsible for suboptimal outcomes. For example,
if on a PM question in the CORR treatment the subject chooses the dominant option
on all twenty replicates but the dominated bet actually pays out, then the subject
feels responsible because they did not give the dominated bet any weight. But
“responsibility” is binary in this setting: as long as the subject chooses both options at
least once, all responsibility is absolved. Thus, the predicted mixture is 19 out of 20
bets on the dominant option, which clearly does not match our data. Whether a more
nuanced definition of responsibility could explain our data remains an open question.
Another possibility is that subjects exhibit irrational diversification (Read and
Loewenstein, 1995; Baltussen and Post, 2011; Rubinstein, 2002). For example, the
subject may incorrectly believe that they are paid for all twenty choices instead of
one randomly-selected choice. In the CORR treatment, choosing different bets on a
PM question allows the subject to hedge against the single realization of uncertainty.
In the IND treatment, however, each bet’s payoff is determined by an independent
realization of uncertainty, so there is no opportunity to hedge. Thus, irrational
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diversification cannot explain mixing in our IND experiment.
The fact that some types of subjects mix in IND but not in SEQ is reminiscent of
the observation that subjects overbid in the simultaneous-move second-price auction
but bid truthfully in the dynamic English auction. Li (2017) argues this is because
truth-telling is obviously dominant in the latter, but not the former. Roughly, this is
because the worst-case outcome under truthful bidding is preferred to the best-case
outcome under any deviation. Unfortunately, this logic does not apply to mixing in
our PM questions. If we view the outcome as “which replicate is chosen for payment,”
then choosing the more-preferred option all twenty times is obviously dominant in
both IND and SEQ. If instead we view the outcome as “which replicate is chosen and
which ball is drawn” then no vector of choices obviously dominates another in either
the IND or SEQ treatments.42
Unfortunately, none of these heuristics or biases explain both mixing in IND and the
reduction of mixing in SEQ. A simple explanation is that subjects have a preference for
randomization in the IND treatment because of decision costs or inattention (captured
by the perturbed utility model discussed above), and the SEQ treatment helps reduce
these costs by focusing the subject on one question at a time.
Finally, we are unaware of any theory that explicitly predicts the increase in mixing
we observe in games, compared to individual decision problems. One conjecture is
that games introduce ambiguity (in the form of strategic uncertainty), and ambiguity
induces randomization behavior. We view this as a promising direction for future
research.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
We study individuals’ tendency to randomize their choices, documenting patterns
within domains and correlations across domains. Randomization is ubiquitous, but
systematic. Randomization is highly correlated within individual, responds monotoni-
cally to parameter changes in the environment, and increases in strategic situations.
Few theories in the literature can accommodate our results, other than those that
directly assume a preference for mixing and little else. When choices are sequential
we find that for some subjects mixing is reduced in decisions with a dominated option,
but not in risky-safe decisions. This effect persists when decisions are then made
42See the appendix for details.
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simultaneously, suggesting that dominated mixing was more of a heuristic for these
individuals, rather than a preference.
Our results highlight a number of open questions. First, it would be interesting
to elicit subjects’ “strategies” for making these decisions. This would allow us to
see whether individuals believe they “should” randomize in these environments.
Similarly, it would be interesting to understand whether randomization is normative;
for example, would individuals choose to randomize for others? Second, we provide
correlations between risk preferences and randomization in the Appendix, but it
would be interesting to learn more about the relationship between risk preferences
and diversification behavior in these environments. One could imagine risk-averse
individuals randomizing in order to hedge, but one could also imagine risk-seeking
individuals randomizing to increase risk. Finally, it would be interesting to study
other interventions that reduce randomization and identify conditions under which
risky-safe randomization also disappears, if such conditions exist.
The results from our SEQ treatment contribute to a growing experimental literature
that investigates interventions that reduce violations of dominance (Charness et al.,
2007; Schulze and Newell, 2016) and, more generally, explore subjects’ ability to
reason about future or hypothetical contingencies (Li, 2017; Esponda and Vespa, 2019;
Martínez-Marquina et al., 2019). Esponda and Vespa (2019) show that violations
of Savage’s sure-thing principle are reduced when subjects are primed to ignore the
“irrelevant” states in a given decision. This is similar to our SEQ treatment which
encourages subjects to focus only on the current replicate. Charness et al. (2007) find
that violations of dominance are reduced when Bayesian updating is not required.
Probability matching has been shown to reduce when subjects are first primed to
think about payoff-maximizing strategies (Gal and Baron, 1996; Newell et al., 2013;
Koehler and James, 2010) or are asked to recommend a strategy to another player
(Fantino and Esfandiari, 2002).
The success of these interventions suggests that probability matching is likely a
mistake.43 Our experiments corroborate this view and add additional insights. Our
43See also Nielsen and Rehbeck (2020), who elicit which axioms subjects wish to follow and, when
their subsequent choices violate the axiom, whether they wish to change either of these decisions. They
include a “consistency” axiom, which implies making the same choice in two identical decisions, and
ask the same lottery choice twice randomly within a set of 33 lottery choices. They find that consistency
violations are usually viewed as a mistake, with subjects changing their lottery choices to make the
same choice in both decisions.
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SEQ treatment identifies the crucial difference in mechanisms driving behavior in
choices that involve dominated lotteries and those that do not. We show that it is
possible to “train away” randomization for about a third of subjects, but only when
choices involve dominated lotteries. Put differently, mixing between risky and safe
lotteries that have no dominance relation does not stem from failure of contingent
reasoning—as is the case those who randomize over dominated options—but rather
indicates the true desire to choose both alternatives with positive probability. This
could be a manifestation of individuals’ uncertainty about their own preferences and
therefore uncertainty about the optimal action (Enke and Graeber, 2019).
Finally, some authors argue that probability matching and randomization behavior
have evolutionary foundations (Cooper, 1989; Gigerenzer, 2002; Brennan and Lo,
2012). Probability matching can be thought of as an evolutionarily stable strategy
(Fretwell, 1972), leading to its persistence in decision making. This could underlie a
heuristic explanation of randomization behavior.
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A. BELIEF PAYMENT PROCEDURE
To elicit subjects’ beliefs, we ask them to imagine filling out a table like the one shown
below. In each row, a subject chooses Option A (which pays if a randomly-selected
column player chooses Left) or Option B (which pays with the given probability, as
determined by rolls of dice). Rather than eliciting all 100 responses, we assume
subjects would start out preferring Option A and at some point would switch to
choosing Option B. We ask subjects to report the row—or probability of receiving
$20—at which they would switch from choosing Option A to choosing Option B. This
is the subject’s belief that Column will choose Left. Call this belief p.
Q# Option A Option B
1 Would you rather have $20 if Column chose Left or 1% chance of $20
2 Would you rather have $20 if Column chose Left or 2% chance of $20
3 Would you rather have $20 if Column chose Left or 3% chance of $20
...
...
...
...
...
99 Would you rather have $20 if Column chose Left or 99% chance of $20
100 Would you rather have $20 if Column chose Left or 100% chance of $20
Table VI: Belief Elicitation Questions
If this belief elicitation were chosen for payment, we would use dice to draw a
uniform random number x ∈ {1, . . . ,100} and pay based on what the subject chose in
row x. Thus, if x< p the subject would receive Option A: $20 if a randomly-selected
column player chose Left. If x≥ p then the subject would receive Option B: $20 with
probability x%. This lottery is also resolved using die rolls: We use dice to draw a
number uniformly from {1, . . . ,100} and pay $20 if the number drawn is less than x.
B. ADDITIONAL RESULTS
B.1. Mixing in ONE Compared to IND and SIM
We verify here that choice frequencies in the ONE treatment cannot be rationalized
as being consistent with randomization behavior in either the SIM or IND treatment.
Consider first the comparison with the SIM treatment, which uses the same set of
subjects. Let pSIMi j be the probability with which subject i chooses the dominant or
risky bet on decision problem j in the SIM treatment. For simplicity, we assume
this is perfectly measured by the fraction of the 20 replicates in which the subject
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chose the dominant or risky bet.44 In the ONE treatment, let xi j = 1 if i chooses the
dominant or risky bet, and xi j = 0 otherwise. Under the null hypothesis that subjects
randomize equally in both treatments, x j =∑i xi j is distributed according to a Poisson
binomial distribution with mean µ j =∑i pSIMi j and variance σ2j =∑i pSIMi j (1− pSIMi j ).
This is well-approximated by a normal distribution with mean µ j and variance σ2j ,
whose cdf we denote by Φ(·|µ j,σ j). Thus, we can reject this null at the 5% level for
each question j if Φ(x j|µ j,σ j)< 0.025 or Φ(x j|µ j,σ j)> 0.975.
Probability (%)
55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80%
ONE vs. SIM
PM 0.998*** 0.987** 0.998*** 0.999*** 0.990*** 0.975**
RS 0.028* 0.157 0.006*** 0.980** 0.923 >0.999***
ONE vs. IND
PM >0.999*** 0.999*** >0.999*** >0.999*** >0.999*** 0.986***
RS 0.013* 0.202 0.146 0.967 0.918 >0.999***
Table VII: The probability of observing choice frequencies equal to or less than those
observed in the ONE treatment under the null hypothesis that mixing frequences are
equal across treatments. Significance levels (two-tailed test): *10%, **5%, ***1%.
In the first row of Table VII we see that Φ(x j|µ j,σ j)≥ 0.975 for all six PM questions,
leading us to conclude that behavior in ONE cannot be explained by the mixing
behavior observed in SIM for any PM questions. In particular, subjects in the ONE
treatment choose the dominant option far more frequently than implied by mixing
frequencies in the SIM treatment. For the RS questions, however, results vary by
question. The risky choice is chosen less often than predicted in the first three
questions, and more often in the last three questions, though statistical significance
varies.45
Comparing the ONE treatment to the IND treatment is more difficult because the
sets of subjects differ between these treatments. Indeed, the IND treatment has 84
subjects while the ONE treatment has 93. Thus, for each i in the ONE treatment
we cannot observe what pONEi j would be if that subject had participated in the IND
44See footnote 45 for a robustness check of this assumption.
45Here we assumed pSIMi j is perfectly measured from behavior in the SIM treatment. An alternative
model is that each pSIMi j is uniformly distributed, but upon observing subject i’s behavior in SIM
we form a Bayesian posterior about pSIMi j . Monte Carlo simulations show that we reject this null
hypotheses even more often than in the perfectly-measured hypothesis. This is because, under the
Bayesian model, each µ j is pushed closer to the prior mean of
∑
i(1/2), while the actual ONE data lie in
the opposite direction.
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treatment. Instead, our null hypothesis is that each pONEi j is randomly drawn with
replacement from the population of 84 pINDi j values we observe in the IND treatment.
Formally, if P j is the set of all pINDi j observed in the IND treatment and ν(·) is the
uniform distribution over (P j)93, then the cdf of x j is given by the mixture distribution
F(x j|ν)=∑p′j ν(p′j)Φ(x j|µ′j,σ′j), where each µ′j and σ′j are derived from p′j, as above.
Since |(P j)93| is large, we estimate the cdf by randomly sampling 100,000 points from
(P j)93 and using that sample to generate an estimate of F(x j|ν).46
The bottom two rows of Table VII report F(x j|ν) and echo the comparisons with the
SIM treatment: In PM questions subjects choose the dominant significantly more often
in the ONE treatment, while in the RS questions subjects jump from choosing the
risky option less often to more often as it becomes more attractive, though statistical
significance in the RS questions is clearly lower.
Figure V: Number of subjects choosing the risky or dominated option in ONE, com-
pared to the numbers predicted by mixing frequencies in the IND and SIM treatments.
Vertical bars show 95% prediction ranges.
The combined results are visualized in Figure V. Overall, we clearly reject the
hypothesis that the frequency of PM choices in the ONE treatment is identical to that
of the SIM or IND treatments (right panel). Statistical results for the RS questions
are mixed (left panel), but behavior in the ONE treatment is clearly more extreme—
46Running this simulation multiple times reveals that the estimates of F(x j|ν) differ by less than
0.001 (at most) across simulations.
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shifting from too low to too high—and not well explained by the mixing probabilities
in either the SIM or IND treatments.
PM RS SC SUMP PM55 PM80
RS 0.46∗∗∗
SC 0.77∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
SUMP 0.40∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗
SUDS 0.14 0.070 0.34∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
SC55 0.71∗∗∗
SC80 0.15
Table VIII: Pairwise Correlations in Individual Mixing in CORR treatment control-
ling for Risk-Attitudes
Notes: ∗∗∗ indicates significance at 1% level.
B.2. Risk Preferences
We investigate whether the tendency to mix relates to subjects’ risk attitudes. Table IX
reports Spearman correlations between tendency to mix in various domains and a
binary variable (“Risk Less”) that takes value one if a subject chose to invest less than
their whole endowment in at least one of the two investment tasks (Block IV) and
zero otherwise.47 Table IX shows that risk averse subjects are more likely to mix in
all four domains and more likely to do so for a larger number of decision problems in
the PM and RS domains. This relation is strong and holds even for PM80 and RS80
questions, for which the likelihood of mixing is among the lowest among all questions
considered. The relationship between risk preferences and randomization behavior
gives further evidence that randomization is a stable individual trait.
B.3. Mixing Definition
In the main text, we say that a subject “randomizes” if they choose less than 90%
of the same choices in a given decision problem. We consider them a “mixer” in a
given domain if they randomize on at least one question in the domain. We consider
alternatives to this definition by tightening the definition per question, and by relaxing
47Under expected utility, risking less than the full endowment indicates that the subject is clearly
risk averse.
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Indicator if mixing in
PM (PM80) RS (RS80) SC (SC80) SUMP SUDS
Risk Less 0.17∗∗∗ (0.14∗∗∗) 0.21∗∗∗ (0.17∗∗∗) 0.16∗∗ (0.01) 0.19∗∗ 0.07
# of questions in which a subject mixes
PM RS
Risk Less 0.19∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
Table IX: Correlation b/w Mixing Behavior and Risk Attitude in the Main Experiment
Notes: We report the pair-wise correlations between mixing behavior in different domains and an
indicator taking the value of one if a subject chose to invest less than their whole endowment in at
least one investment task. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
the definition per domain.
In Figure VII, we define randomization on a given question as choosing at least
one different choice per decision problem. We define randomization per domain as
mixing on a single decision problem in that domain, as in the main text. Naturally,
randomization rates are slightly higher per question, but the same general trends
emerge.
In Figure VIII, we define randomization on a given question as choosing at least one
different choice per decision problem, as above. We define randomization per domain
as mixing on at least two decision problems in that domain. Randomization per
domain mostly decreases for SC and SU, where there are only two decision problems.
Finally, in Figure IX, we define randomization on a given question as in the main
text, choosing less than 90% of the same choices in a decision problem. We define
randomization per domain as mixing on at least two decision problems. Similar to the
above definition, the main decrease in mixing comes from the SC and SU games.
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Figure VI: Mixing Behavior in IND, SEQ, and SIM Treatments for All Sequences
Figure VII: Mixing Behavior Across Domains: Alternative Definition 1
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Figure VIII: Mixing Behavior Across Domains: Alternative Definition 2
Figure IX: Mixing Behavior Across Domains: Alternative Definition 3
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C. THEORIES OF MIXING
In this appendix we describe several candidate theories that can explain mixing
behavior, particularly in PM questions where mixing is stochastically dominated.
To begin, we briefly introduce some of the notation developed in Appendix D.
Subjects face many choice problems, each of which has 20 replicates (or, one replicate
in the ONE treatment). Each choice problem is given by D i = { f i, g i}, where f i and g i
are acts that map Bingo ball draws into monetary payments. Letting B= {1, . . . ,20}
be the set of possible ball draws and X = {$2,$1,$0} represent the three possible
monetary payments, an act is thus a function f i : B → X . Each ball is drawn with
probability 1/20, so we can also think of f i as a the lottery it induces over X .
In some examples we imagine a “smaller” version of our experiment with n < 20
replicates and n possible ball draws; the adjustment in notation for those cases should
cause no confusion.
We use a shorthand notation for acts: xk y means x ∈ X is paid if b≤ k, and y ∈ X is
paid otherwise. Thus, 2130 is the act that pays $2 if the ball drawn is 1–13, and $0
if the ball drawn is 14–20. We simply write 1 for the act that pays $1 regardless of
b. With this notation, our PM questions are of the form {2k0,0k2} for k ∈ {11, . . . ,16}.
Notice that 2k0 stochastically dominates 0k2 (when viewed as lotteries), but does not
dominate it state-by-state. Our RS questions are of the form {2k0,1}, which has no
dominance relationship.
Let j index the 20 replicates of the ith decision problem, and ai j ∈ { f i, g i} be the
subject’s actual choice on replicate j. The vector ai = (ai1, . . . ,ai20} represents choices
made on all twenty replicates. In the IND treatment there is a ball draw b j for each
replicate j. If replicate j of problem i is chosen for payment then the subject is paid
ai j(b j) ∈ X . In the CORR treatment there is only one ball draw, denoted b1 ∈B, and
the subject is paid ai j(b1) when replicate j is chosen.
Because we are interested in mixing across replicates, we assume the subject has
a preference over all 20 replicates given by º over the various possible vectors ai.
Their preference on a single replication is then given by º0 over acts themselves. For
example, a subject who has f i º0 g i might then have ( f i, f i, . . . , f i)º (g i, f i, . . . , f i). Or,
if the subject prefers to mix, then perhaps some mixed vector would be preferred over
( f i, f i, . . . , f i).
We say that º respects replicate dominance if ai º a′i whenever, for every j,
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ai j º0 a′i j. An implication of replicate dominance is that if f i º0 g i on the indi-
vidual replicates then ( f i, f i, . . . , f i) must be preferred over every other vector a′i.
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Thus, replicate dominance rules out mixing on any problem.
Similarly, º respects stochastic dominance if ai º a′i whenever, for every j, ai j
stochastically dominates a′i j. Thus, respecting stochastic dominance means that the
subject can never mix in any PM question, but can possibly mix in RS questions.
Notice that if º0 always selects stochastically dominant options then respecting
replicate dominance implies the subject also respects stochastic dominance.
In our experiment we observe mixing on PM questions, even though we do see
strong evidence in the ONE treatment that º0 selects the stochastically-dominant
option for the vast majority of subjects. Thus, for a large number of subjects, º
respects neither replicate dominance nor stochastic dominance. We therefore seek
a theory in which (1) replicate and stochastic dominance are not respected, (2) º0
selects stochastically dominant options, and (3) these patterns hold true in both the
IND and CORR frameworks. We now review a handful of models and show that none
satisfactorily satisfy all three requirements.
C.1. Preferences Over Reduced Lotteries
As discussed in the paper, mixing implies convex preferences over reduced lotteries,
and mixing in PM questions requires violations of dominance. Here we describe in
further detail two theories in this domain.
C.1.a. Regret Aversion
Loomes and Sugden (1982) describe a theory of regret aversion wherein a subject
experiences regret in some state if an alternative choice would have yielded a higher
utility index. For example, consider the PM75 question D i = { f , g}, where f = 2150
and g= 0152, in the CORR treatment. If L= {b : b≤ 15} obtains then choosing f on a
given replicate gives ex-post payoff u2 := u(2)+R(u(2)−u(0)), while choosing g gives
u0 := u(0)+R(u(0)−u(2)). The opposite payoffs occur in event H = {b : b> 15}. Loomes
and Sugden (1982) assume R(0)= 0 and R(·) is non-decreasing, which implies u2 > u0.
Consequently, the “regret-adjusted” payoffs of choosing f stochastically dominate
48If we view f i and g i as lotteries, this implication is called compound betweenness, which is a
weakening of the compound independence axiom; see Camerer and Ho (1994).
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those of g, and so a subject maximizing regret-adjusted expected utility should not
mix.
C.1.b. Probability Weighting
Under this theory a subject evaluates the lottery p = (p1, x1; . . . ; pn, xn) according to
the functional
U(p)=∑
i
w(pi)u(xi),
where w : [0,1]→ [0,1] is a probability weighting function that is onto and strictly
increasing, and u is a strictly increasing utility index. Behaviorally, this model
assumes that subjects first transform the vector of probabilities into a vector of
weights (which may not sum to one) and then satisfy the independence axiom using
these weighted probabilities.
Consider a PM question where the dominant bet pays off with probability p> 1/2.
Denote the proportion of dominant bets the subject chooses by q ∈ [0,1]. Then their
overall utility is given by
w(qp+ (1− q)(1− p))u(2)+w(q(1− p)+ (1− q)p)u(0).
If this function is decreasing in q at q= 1 then the subject will not choose the dominant
bet in every replication.49 It is decreasing at q= 1 if
u(2)
u(0)
w′(p)<w′(1− p). (1)
Since u(2)> u(0), we get mixing only when w is highly asymmetric: very steep at low
probabilities (1− p) and flat for high probabilities (p).50 In that case the subject is
happy to sacrifice their 20th dominant bet (which costs them w′(p)u(2) on the margin)
for their first dominated bet (which gains them w′(1− p)u(0) on the margin).51
In theory it is possible to find such a function, but standard weighting functions
in the literature do not feature this sort of asymmetry. For the standard Prelec
weighting function (wP(p) = e−β(− ln(p))α) the slopes are not sufficiently asymmetric
49For simplicity we assume here that q can take any value in [0,1].
50Decreasing at q= 1 is sufficient to show mixing if the objective is concave. Roughly speaking, for
inverse-S weighting functions the objective is concave for all q ∈ [0,1] as long as w(·) is not “too convex”
at p.
51We omit a common factor of 2p−1 on both margins.
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Figure X: The usual Prelec weighting function (dashed) is not sufficiently asymmetric
to generate mixing. The modified version (solid) is, but its inflection point is too high
to match empirical estimates.
(see the dashed curve in Figure X). But the weighting function w(p)= 1−wP(1− p)
(which simply takes the Prelec function and flips both the x- and y-axes; see the
solid curve in Figure X) is asymmetric enough to generate an interior maximum.
For example, with α = 0.6, β = 1.6, and u(x) = x0.5, the optimal mix in the p = 0.80
question is q = 17/20. Similar calculations show that this function can also predict
mixing in the RS questions.
Unfortunately, any inverse-S-shaped function that can generate mixing (steep for
low p and flat for high p) is necessarily going to have an inflection point that’s too high
to match empirical estimates. Wu and Gonzalez (1996) estimate that the inflection
point should be at or below 0.40—meaning w′(·) is increasing for p> 0.40—but mixing
in PM55 implies that w′(0.45)>w′(0.55).
Source preference theories (Tversky and Fox, 1995; Abdellaoui et al., 2011, e.g.) are
a generalization of probability weighting that allow for different weighting functions
on different sources of uncertainty. For example, which replicate is paid and which
ball is drawn. In applications, however, source functions differ only if events have
unknown probability, as in the Ellsberg paradox. In our experiment all uncertainty is
objective, so we apply only a single probability weighting function.
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C.2. Preferences Over Two-Stage Lotteries
C.2.a. Perturbed Utility Models
Applying the perturbed utility model of Allen and Rehbeck (2019) to our setting, a
subject facing decision problem { f i, g i} who picks f i in k out of 20 replicates receives
utility
k
20
U( f i)+ 20−k20 U(g i)+V (
k
20
),
where U(·) is any utility for the underlying lotteries—it need not be consistent with
any particular model like expected utility—and V (k) has a unique maximizer. For
exposition, assume k is continuous and V is differentiable so that the optimal k∗ is
given by the first-order condition
−V ′( k
20
)=U( f i)−U(g i).
In other words, the subject balances their marginal preference for randomization with
the utility difference between the two options.
In the SEQ treatment a subject making their choice on the jth replicate chooses a
plan to select f i in k j ∈ {0, . . . ,n− j} remaining replicates, giving a utility of
k
n− jU( f i)+
n− j−k
n− j U(g i)+V (
k
n− j ).
Under the differentiability assumption, this is maximized at the k∗ for which
−V ′( k
n− j )=U( f i)−U(g i).
Thus, this model does not predict a drop in mixing frequency in the SEQ treatment.
It is possible, however, that a different formulation of the V (·) function could predict
a difference; a formulation in which not only the proportion matters but also the
number of choices.
C.2.b. Siegel’s Perturbed Utility Model
Siegel (1961, Model II) proposes a model of decision-making designed expressly to
predict probability matching. According to this theory the subject experiences greater
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utility for predicting the less-likely event, and also receives positive utility for varying
their choice across replications. The latter is described as a direct preference for
avoiding monotonous repetition, and is not related to the variance in outcomes (such
as with risk-seeking expected utility).
To illustrate, consider the PM75 question, where betting f has a 15/20 chance of
paying off. Normalize to 1 the marginal utility of a correct prediction of the more-
likely event, let α≥ 1 be the marginal utility of a correct prediction of the less-likely
event, and let β≥ 0 be the marginal utility of variance. The overall expected utility of
choosing f k times out of 20 (in either IND or CORR) is then given by
U( fk g)=
15
20
k
20
+α 5
20
20−k
20
+β k
20
20−k
20
.
Assuming c> 0 and ignoring integer constraints, this is maximized at
k∗ = 10+ 15−5α
2β
.
Without knowledge of α and β, this model can predict any mixing behavior in both
the IND and CORR treatment. The exact probability matching result (k∗ = 15) obtains
whenever 15−5α= 10β. In fact, an increased utility for predicting rare events (b> 1)
is not needed for this prediction, as α= β= 1 is one parameterization that leads to
k∗ = 15.
Our purpose in comparing various models is to identify possible underlying causes
for mixing behavior. To that end we find this model somewhat unenlightening because
it essentially assumes the result: subjects mix because they have a direct preference
for varying their choices. If we shut down this direct preference for variation in
choices (by setting β= 0) then the model predicts that the subject will choose their
most-preferred choice in all 20 replicates (that is, f if α< 3 and g if α> 3).
C.2.c. u-v Preferences and Utility for Gambling
Several authors (Neilson, 1992; Schmidt, 1998; Diecidue et al., 2004) have described
versions of a model where preferences satisfy expected utility on the interior of the
simplex with utility index u, but certain payments are evaluated by a different
function v 6= u. This can be used to explain a disproportionate preference for certainty
(v> u) or an explicit preference for gambling (u> v).
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In our CORR treatment we view the state space to be C×B—capturing both the
choice of which replicate is paid and which ball is drawn. With that view, no PM
question offers certainty, as both bets have some chance of not paying off. Since these
models assume expected utility away from certainty, they cannot explain mixing in
the PM questions.
Suppose instead we view the problem to be a two-stage lottery, where C is chosen
first and then B is chosen second. Choosing f on all 20 replicates does guarantee
certainty in the first stage, but not the second. We could apply u-v preferences to
the first stage alone, in which case mixing can be predicted. Indeed, mixing is then
equivalent to a violation of replicate dominance (defined in the introduction of this
appendix).
C.3. Mistakes, Biases, and Heuristics
Here we review in more detail those models discussed in the text.
C.3.a. Gambler’s Fallacy: Expected Utility with Negative Correlation
The gambler’s fallacy is the mistaken belief in negative serial correlation. Consider a
probability matching question {2k0,0k2} where k> 10. Roughly, a subject who chooses
2k0 (or, bets b ≤ k) several times in a row might feel that b > k is “due” on the next
replicate. Now, ball draws are not observed sequentially, but this belief in negative
correlation can still drive subjects to exhibit mixing in PM questions.
To show this formally, fix k> 10 and let L= {b : b≤ k} be the event that bet 2k0 pays
off, and H = {b : b> k} be the event that bet 0k2 pays off. The objective probability of
event L is p= k/20. A subject exhibiting the gambler’s fallacy wrongly believes events
L and H are negatively correlated. Let p(L|L) denote the subject’s probability of L
on some replicate j > 1 given that L occurred on j−1. A fully rational subject would
have p(L|L)= k/20, but instead we model the subject’s belief as
p(L|L)=α0+ (1−α)p,
where α ∈ [0,1] is a simple way of capturing the subject’s degree of gambler’s fallacy.
We refer to this belief as α-negative correlation, where α= 0 represents the objectively
correct belief.
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State Probability (α-Negative Correlation) f f Pays f g Pays
LL p[α0+ (1−α)p] = (1−α)p2 1 12
LH p[α1+ (1−α)(1− p)] = p− (1−α)p2 12 1
HL (1− p)[α1+ (1−α)p] = p(1− p)+α(1− p)2 12 0
HH (1− p)[α0+ (1−α)(1− p)] = (1−α)(1− p)2 0 12
Table X: A two-choice PM example with α-negative correlation.
To illustrate the model, suppose the subject chooses between f = 2k0 and g= 0k2
only twice (instead of 20 times). The four relevant states of the world and their
corresponding probabilities are then given in the first two columns of Table X. A
subject considers two possible betting strategies: betting f both times ( f f ) and betting
f then g ( f g). Assuming expected utility and normalizing u(2)= 1 and u(0)= 0, the
expected payoff of each strategy for each state—taking into account that each bet has
a 1/2 chance of being paid—is shown in the right two columns of Table X.
From the table we calculate the following expected utilities for each strategy:
Eu( f f )= p−α1
2
(
p2− (1− p)2) , and
Eu( f g)= p− (1−α)1
2
(
p2− (1− p)2) .
From these we can see that mixing ( f g) is preferred if and only if (1−α)<α, or α> 1/2.
Our data show that mixing propensity changes with p, but, at least for this simple
specification, that is not predicted.
If there are n> 2 replicates then the strategy of alternating bets ( f g f g f g . . .) will
continue to be optimal for large enough α.52 Here we assume the subject views
draws as a Markov process, with each draw affected only by the previous draw. If
we assumed a more complex correlation structure we could predict more complex
patterns of mixing, such as f f f g f f f g.
For RS questions, a subject prefers f (which pays $2 with probability p) over g
($1 for sure) in a single decision if and only if u(1)< p, where u(1) ∈ (0,1) represents
52To see this, consider α = 1. The subject believes the sequence LHLHLH . . . will occur with
probability p> 1/2, and HLHLHL . . . will occur with probability 1− p< 1/2. Thus, the alternating bet
strategy is strictly optimal. By continuity this must be true for all α in some neighborhood of one. In
fact, numerical calculations suggest that the threshold α∗ may even decrease in n, though we have yet
to prove this claim.
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the subject’s risk aversion. With two decisions, f f pays as above, while f g gives
an expected utility of (1/2)p+ (1/2)u(1). Thus, f g is preferred over f f whenever
u(1) > p−α[p2+ (1− p)2]. In other words, mixing can occur whenever p > u(1) >
p−α[p2+(1−p)2]. The larger is the value of α, the wider the range of risk preferences
in which we predict mixing. Mixing is never predicted, however, if u(1)> p, because
such a subject always prefers gg (with sure payoff of u(1)) over f g (with expected
utility (1/2)p+ (1/2)u(1)). Thus, we should expect to see some mixing in the questions
Mixing in the SEQ treatment under this model is identical to the IND treatment
because information about which replicate is paid would not affect the belief in
correlation across ball draws. The lack of mixing in the ONE treatment is also
predicted, since only a single draw is realized.
In the CORR treatment, however, mixing is not predicted. There is only one ball
drawn and so there are only two possible states of the world: L and H. Negative
correlation cannot affect beliefs, and so this model reduces to the standard expected
utility framework in which mixing is strictly dominated in PM questions and depends
on whether u(1) > p in RS questions. Thus, the gambler’s fallacy cannot explain
mixing in the CORR treatment.
Rabin (2002) models the gambler’s fallacy as a subject who believes draws are made
without replacement. This particular form of negative correlation does not predict
mixing in our IND treatment. For example, in the PM75 question (where s= 15) the
subject would believe that that f will pay off in exactly 15 bets and g will pay off in
exactly 5, but all orderings of those outcomes are equally likely. Thus, from an ex-ante
perspective, there is no reason to believe that any one pattern of outcomes is more
likely than another, and so there is no reason to generate any particular pattern of
bets. Our version of negative correlation, however, does produce expected patterns
and, thus, optimal betting patterns in the IND treatment. Rabin and Vayanos (2010)
propose a model of the gambler’s fallacy much closer to ours which does predict mixing
in the PM domain for IND, but not CORR.
C.3.b. Modal Count Heuristic
According to this heuristic the decision-maker focuses on the number of times an event
will occur, but not the order of events, and their objective is to maximize the number of
“correct” bets made. For example, in the PM60 question, the subject wrongly focuses
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Num. Total
Event Probability of L Prob.
LLL 8/27 3 8/27
LLH 4/27
2 12/27LHL 4/27
HLL 4/27
LHH 2/27
1 6/27HLH 2/27
HHL 2/27
HHH 1/27 0 1/27
Table XI: Modal Count Example: Possible Events and Corresponding Probabilities
on the fact that the dominant bet is most likely to pay off in 12 of the 20 replicates, so
they choose the dominant bet 12 times. They do so because they wrongly believe this
maximizes the chance of all bets paying off.
To illustrate, consider the simpler case of three replicates and three Bingo balls
(B= {b1,b2,b3}). Let f = 220 be a bet on L= {b1,b2}, and g= 022 be a bet on H = {b3}.
Since n= 3 there are 23 = 8 possible payoff-relevant events, which we enumerate in
Table XI. In this case, two Ls and one H is the most likely outcome count, with a total
probability of 12/27, so the subject bets f twice and g once. What they fail to realize
is that the order of their bets matters and in fact their true probability of getting all
three bets correct is only 4/27, not 12/27.
In the CORR treatment, however, there are only two possible outcomes: L obtains
for all twenty replicates, or H obtains for all twenty replicates. Thus, a subject focused
on the modal number of outcomes should never mix.
C.3.c. Regret & Convex Costs of Mistakes
According to this theory, the subject has a convex cost of “mistakes,” where a mistake
is simply a bet that doesn’t pay off. Choosing f = 2k0 all twenty times in the CORR
treatment opens the possibility that all twenty bets turned out to be wrong, ex post.
Mixing reduces the maximum number of mistakes the subject might make.
Formally, the subject’s preference over mixtures is represented by the menu-
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dependent utility function
U( fk g|{ f , g})=
k
n
v( f )+ n−k
n
v(g)
−α 1
20
∑
b∈B
(
w
(
k
n
)
max{g(b)− f (b),0}+w
(
n−k
n
)
max{ f (b)− g(b),0}
)
,
where B= {1, . . . ,20}, v(·) represents preferences over degenerate acts in X B, α≥ 0 is
an individual-specific scale parameter, and w(·) is an increasing and weakly convex
function satisfying w(0)= 0. The summation term counts for each state the fraction
of times the subject made the “wrong” choice in that state, which is then weighted
by the convex function w(·) and multiplied by the payoff magnitude of the mistake.
Convexity captures the idea that the decision maker finds it especially undesirable to
have states in which they have made many incorrect choices. Thus, they would gladly
add mistakes in states where they have relatively few in order to reduce mistakes in
states where they have many.
To see how this preference generates probability matching, consider the probability
matching decision problem D i = { f , g}, where f = 2k0 and g= 0k2, with k> 10. If the
decision maker picks f in s replications (so, picks fs g) and w(x) = x2 then the cost
term becomes
−α 1
20
(
k
(n− s
n
)2
(2−0)+ (20−k)
( s
n
)2
(2−0)
)
.
In words, there are k states in which f is the better choice but g is chosen in n−sn of
the replications, and there are 20− k states in which g is the better choice but f is
chosen in sn of the replications. Maximizing over s gives the solution
s∗ = k
20
n,
which is exactly the probability matching prediction. This decision maker faces a
tension between choosing the act with the higher base value (by comparing v( f ) to
v(g)) and performing probability matching to reduce the cost of mistakes. Individuals
with a higher value of α will lean more toward probability matching, while individuals
with α= 0 will choose the more-preferred act in every replication.
In the IND treatment, however, we can show that the distribution of the number
of mistakes shifts up (in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance) whenever a
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bet of f is replaced by a bet of g. Intuitively, betting on g increases the chance of a
mistake on this replicate, and, regardless of the draws of the balls, is unrelated to
the number of mistakes made in other replicates. Thus, the expected cost of mistakes
necessarily increases for any w. Betting f all 20 times maximizes the expected payoff
and minimizes the cost of mistakes, making it the predicted choice regardless of w
and α.
C.3.d. Responsibility Aversion
Dwenger et al. (2018) also find evidence of mixing in repeated binary choices without
a dominant option. They propose a theory of responsibility aversion in which the
subject uses mixing to avoid being responsible for any suboptimal outcomes they may
incur.
To illustrate this theory, consider the PM75 question in the CORR treatment given
by D i = { f , g}, where f = 2150 and g = 0152. Recall that ai represents a vector of 20
choices from D i. Let ai = fk g represent the choice of f in k replicates and g in 20−k
replicates (the ordering of choices is irrelevant for this theory). Thus, f20 g denotes
the choice of f in all 20 replicates and f0 g denotes the choice of g in all 20 replicates.
Dwenger et al. (2018) define the responsibility set of any ai to be the set of states in
which some other choice vector would have been better in every replicate. For our
CORR treatment this is be given by
m(ai)=
{
b ∈B : (∃a′i ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . ,n}) a′i j(b)> ai j(b)
}
.
For example, m( f20 g)= {16, . . . ,20} because in those states f0 g would earn more money
in every replicate. Symmetrically, m( f0 g)= {1, . . . ,15} because in the low states f20 g
would earn more money in every replicate. For any other mixture fk g (k 6∈ {0,20}) we
have m( fk g)=; because, regardless of which ball is drawn, there will always be at
least one replicate in which fk g selected the higher-paying bet.
Let º represent expected-utility preferences, so that f20 g is maximal according to
º. A responsibility-averse decision maker instead has a preference º∗ that only needs
to agree with º when the more-preferred action also has a smaller responsibility set.
Formally, if ai º a′i and m(ai)⊆m(a′i) then ai º∗ a′i. If instead m(ai) is not contained
in m(a′i) then º∗ can have either ordering of ai and a′i.
For our probability matching question, we have f20 g Â fk g Â f0 g for all non-
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degenerate mixtures fk g. But m( f20 g) 6⊆m( fk g), so it can be the case that fk gÂ∗ f20 g.
Now, m( fk g)(m( f0 g) so we do have the prediction that fk gº∗ f0 g.
But now, for any k ∈ {2, . . . ,19} consider fk g compared to fk−1 g. We have that
fk g º fk−1 g and m( fk g) = ; = m( fk−1 g), so fk g º∗ fk−1 g. Thus, the º∗-maximal
vector of choices must be either f200 or f190. We see subjects choosing the dominated
bet far more often than once, so this theory (as specified) cannot explain the degree of
mixing we observe in our CORR treatment.53
C.3.e. Irrational Diversification
In this theory the subject maximizes expected utility but incorrectly believes they
will be paid for all choices, rather than one randomly-selected choice. We will show
that this can lead to rational mixing in the correlated treatment, but not in the
independent treatment.
The intuition is as follows. Suppose D i = { f , g}, where f = 2150 and g = 0152, so
f is the dominant choice. To illustrate, let n = 2. Choosing ai = ( f , f ) in the CORR
treatment gives the subject a 3/4 chance of $4 and a 1/4 chance of $0. But a′i = ( f , g)
gives the subject $2 for sure. The bet g offers a perfect hedge in case f does not pay
off. A sufficiently risk averse subject will therefore choose a′i.
In the independent treatment, ai = ( f , f ) gives a 9/16 chance of $4 and a 1/16 chance
of $0, while a′i = ( f , g) gives a 3/16 chance of $4 and a 3/16 chance of $0. The remaining
probability in both is on $2. In this case g does not offer a hedge against losing in f
since the two bets pay off independently. Here, a′i is stochastically dominated by ai
and should never be chosen.
C.3.f. Obvious Dominance
We begin with three notions of dominance, taken from the Online Appendix.
• ai C-dominates a′i if, for all j, ai j º0 a′i j.
• ai C-stochastically dominates a′i if, for all j, ai j stochastically dominates a
′
i j.
• ai C×Bn-dominates a′i if, for all j and b j, ai j(b j)≥ a′i j(b j).
53In our IND treatment the state space is B20. For any ai the responsibility set is the set of state-
vectors b ∈B20 such that ai j(b j)= 0 for every j. But if ai 6= a′i then m(ai) and m(a′i) are not related by
inclusion. Thus, this theory places no restrictions on º∗. In other words, all possible preferences are
admissible.
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We see a substantial amount of mixing in the IND and CORR treatment, indicating
that C-stochastic dominance is violated. But mixing is reduced in the sequential
treatment. We now explore conditions that guarantee no mixing in the SEQ treatment.
Li (2017) shows how, in allocation settings, moving from a simultaneous-move
auction (such as the sealed-bid second-price auction) to a sequential-move auction
(such as the English clock auction) can make the dominance property of truth-telling
more “obvious” to the bidder. The informal intuition is that in the clock auction the
bidder only needs to consider the current clock price—should she stay in or out—
whereas in the sealed-bid auction she should consider all possible highest bids of
her opponent. Li (2017) formalizes this by strengthening dominance to a comparison
of worst-case payoffs of the dominant plan to best-case payoffs of the considered
deviation; if the worst-case payoff of the dominant plan is preferred to the best-case
payoff of the deviation, then no state-by-state contingent reasoning is needed to
determine dominance.
In our experiment one might expect that truth-telling (always picking the more-
preferred option) is similarly more “obvious” in the SEQ treatment. We show, however,
that Li’s definition of obvious dominance does not predict any treatment difference
between IND and SEQ. The reason is that truth-telling is already obviously dominant
in the IND treatment: The worst-case outcome under truth-telling still gives the
subject their most-preferred option, so no deviation can possibly provide a better
outcome. In the following we formalize this insight.
In the SEQ treatment each decision problem i can be viewed as a one-player game.
Nature moves first, choosing ci ∈C. Then the subject has n information sets. At each
information set j the subject knows ci ≥ j and chooses between f i and g i. If ci = j
then the game ends and the chosen act ai j is paid (assuming r = i, which is revealed
at the end of the experiment). If ci > j then the subject continues to information set
j+1. The subject’s strategy in the game is an entire plan ai = (ai1, . . . ,ain).
To give Li’s definition of obvious dominance, we need to identify the first information
set at which two plans ai and a′i differ. Formally, let jˆ(ai,a
′
i)=min{ j : ai j 6= a′i j}.
Definition 1. We can refine our original notions of C- and C×Bn-dominance to apply
at each information set j:
1. ai C-dominates a′i at j if, for all j
′ ≥ j, ai j′ º0 a′i j′ .
2. ai C×Bn-dominates a′i at j if, for all j′ ≥ j and b j′ ∈B, ai j′(b j′)≥ a′i j′(b j′).
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For each of those there is an equivalent notion of obvious dominance:
1. ai C-obviously dominates a′i if, for all j ≥ jˆ(ai,a′i) and all j′ ≥ jˆ(ai,a′i), ai j º0 a′i j′ .
2. ai C×Bn-obviously dominates a′i if, for all j ≥ jˆ(ai,a′i), all b j ∈B, all j′ ≥ jˆ(ai,a′i),
and all b j′ ∈B, ai j(b j)≥ a′i j′(b j′).
In words, the notions of obvious dominance (1) look only at the present and future
information sets, and (2) compare the worst-case scenario under ai to the best-case
scenario under a′i. In C-obvious dominance the best and worst cases are with respect
to only which ci is drawn. In C×Bn-obvious dominance the best and worst cases are
with respect to both the draw of ci and b j.
To illustrate, suppose a subject in the SEQ treatment with n= 5 faces a PM question
( f i = 2k0 and g i = 0k2 with k 6∈ {0,n}) and has f i Â0 g i. Consider ai = ( f i, f i, f i, f i, f i)
versus a′i = ( f i, f i, g i, f i, g i). The first replicate at which these differ is at jˆ(ai,a′i)= 3.
Under C-obvious dominance, the worst-case j ≥ 3 under ai is that the subject receives
f i (indeed, it is the only possible outcome). The best-case outcome under a′i is that
j = 4, which gives a′i4 = f i. This is no better than the worst-case outcome under
ai, so ai C-obviously dominates a′i. A similar argument applies for any a
′
i, so ai
is C-obviously dominant. Indeed, truth-telling (ai = ( f i, . . . , f i)) will be C-obviously
dominant for any n.
For C ×Bn-obvious dominance, however, ai = ( f i, f i, f i, f i, f i) does not obviously
dominate a′i. This is because for any j ≥ 3 there some b j > k for which f i(b j) = $0,
while for any j′ ≥ 3 there is some b j′ for which ai j′(b j′)= $2. In other words, since f i
does not B-dominate g i, we cannot have C×Bn-obvious dominance of ai. An identical
argument holds for RS questions, since again the minimum payment of one choice is
always strictly less than the maximum payment of the opposite choice.
But notice that the following two paragraphs hold equally true for the IND and SIM
treatments. In those settings there is only one information set. For any ai and a′i we
simply set jˆ(ai,a′i)= 1; otherwise the definitions above apply. And the argument that
truth-telling is C-obviously dominant—but not C×Bn-obvious dominant—remains
true. Thus, neither form of obvious dominance can predict mixing in the IND treat-
ment but no mixing in the SEQ treatment.
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D. NOTIONS OF DOMINANCE, MIXING, AND INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY
D.1. Setup and Experimental Design
Choice objects are acts f : B→ X , where B= {1, . . . ,n} is the set of possible draws from
a Bingo cage containing n numbered balls and X = {$2,$1,$0} is the set of possible
monetary prizes.54 Each ball in B is drawn with objective probability 1/n, but we
generally model choice objects as acts. We can describe f as an n-vector—such as
f = (2,0, . . . ,1,1)—to indicate the prize awarded in each state. For any two prizes
x, y ∈ X and any k ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n} let xk y be the act that pays x in the first k states and y
otherwise. For example, 2100 is the bet that pays $2 in states 1–10 and $0 otherwise.
The constant act that pays x in every state is denoted simply as x.
The subject is given m different decision problems, each of which is a choice between
two acts. Denote the ith problem by D i = { f i, g i}. The subject makes each of these
choices n times. The subject’s choice on the jth replicate of the ith problem is given by
ai j ∈D i. Let a= (ai j)i, j ∈×mi=1Dni be the entire matrix of choices and ai = (ai1, . . . ,ain) ∈
Dni be the vector of choices made across the n replicates of the ith problem.
In our baseline condition one ball is drawn (with replacement) for each of the n
replicates. Let b= (b1, . . . ,bn) ∈Bn be the vector of all n draws. Act ai j is paid based
on draw b j ∈B. The final payment is therefore ai j(b j) ∈ X .
We employ the RPS mechanism, meaning one of the mn choices is chosen randomly
for payment. The decision problem chosen (the “row” of the matrix a) is determined by
a randomization device with realizations r ∈R = {1, . . . ,m}, and the replicate (“column”)
is determined by a separate randomization device with realizations c ∈C = {1, . . . ,n}.
Thus, the combined state (r, c) determines which problem and which replicate is
paid. The announcement of a= (ai j)i, j generates an act which pays act ai j in state
(r, c)= (i, j). And the act ai j pays ai j(b j) in each state b j ∈B. The entire state space
for the experiment is therefore given by R×C×Bn, and the whole matrix of choices a
is an act in X R×C×B
n
.
We set n = 20 throughout our experiment. Probability matching (PM) questions
are given by f = 2k0 and g= 0k2, where k ∈ {11,12, . . . ,16}. Risky-Safe (RS) questions
offer f = 2k0 and g= 1, where again k ∈ {11,12, . . . ,16}. We do not model games here,
54In the actual experiment X = {$25,$15,$5}; we use {$2,$1,$0} only for notational convenience.
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though the games of strategic certainty (SC) are identical to the PM choices except in
framing.
The IND and SIM treatments are as described above. In the CORR treatment only
one ball b1 ∈B is drawn, and each ai j pays ai j(b1). The entire state space is therefore
R×C×B, and so º∗ is defined over X R×C×B. In the SEQ treatment there are n ball
draws, as in IND, but now the column chosen for payment (ci) is drawn in advance,
the subject chooses each ai j sequentially, starting at j = 1 and proceeding until j = ci.
The ONE treatment simply sets n= 1.
To model choices, we start by assuming the subject has a preference º∗ over the
entire choice matrix a ∈ X R×C×Bn . This is useful later for describing the assumptions
under which our payment mechanism is incentive compatible. But for now our focus
is on how the subject chooses across the n replications of a single decision problem. In
other words, for each decision problem i, we are interested in studying preferences
over ai ∈ X C×Bn . To capture this we define º over various ai by
ai º a′i ⇔

ai
ai
...
ai
º∗

a′i
a′i
...
a′i
 . (2)
We can then derive a preference º0 over single choice objects in X B by
ai j º0 a′i j ⇔ (ai j,ai j, . . . ,ai j)º (a′i j,a′i j, . . . ,a′i j). (3)
D.2. Dominance, Monotonicity, and Mixing
Consider a subject who faces only one decision problem D i, and does so n times. Thus,
their only choices are ai = (ai1, . . . ,ain). We can view this as equivalent to having m
rows but choosing the same vector ai in every row, because then the draw of the row
would be irrelevant.
Given these derived preferences, we can formulate several useful notions of domi-
nance. The first is simply stochastic dominance, while the others are various notions
of statewise dominance.
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Definition 2. Let ρ be an objective probability measure on (the discrete topology of)
B.
1. f stochastically dominates g if, for every x ∈ X , ρ({b : f (b)≤ x})≤ ρ({b : g(b)≤ x}).
2. f B-dominates g if, for all b, f (b)≥ g(b).
3. ai C-dominates a′i if, for all j, ai j º0 a′i j.
4. ai C-stochastically dominates a′i if, for all j, ai j stochastically dominates a
′
i j.
5. ai C×Bn-dominates a′i if, for all j and b j, ai j(b j)≥ a′i j(b j).
6. a R-dominates a′ if, for all i, ai º a′i.
In general, an object is said to be dominant (under the appropriate notion of
dominance) if it dominates all other alternatives. For example, ai is C-dominant if it
C-dominates every a′i.
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For each notion of dominance we can also define an equivalent notion of monotonicity
(with respect to dominance) of the subject’s preference.56
Definition 3. 1. º0 satisfies stochastic monotonicity if f º0 g whenever f stochas-
tically dominates g.
2. º0 satisfies B-monotonicity if f º0 g whenever f B-dominates g.
3. º satisfies C-monotonicity if ai º a′i whenever ai C-dominates a′i.
4. º satisfies C-stochastic monotonicity if ai º a′i whenever ai C-stochastically
dominates a′i.
5. º satisfies C×Bn-monotonicity if ai º a′i whenever ai C×Bn-dominates a′i.
6. º∗ satisfies R-monotonicity if aº∗ a′ whenever a R-dominates a′.
55In Appendix C C-dominance was called replicate dominance, and C-stochastic dominance was
simply called stochastic dominance.
56In earlier drafts R-monotonicity was called “row monotonicity” and C-monotonicity was called
“replicate monotonicity.”
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Each of these can equivalently be defined in terms of deviations in a single state.
For example, an equivalent definition of R-monotonicity is that, for all i, ai, a′i, and
a′′, 
a′′1
...
a′′i−1
ai
a′′i+1
...
a′′m

º∗

a′′1
...
a′′i−1
a′i
a′′i+1
...
a′′m

⇔ ai º a′i.
And an equivalent defition of C-monotonicity is that, for all i, j, ai j, a′i j, and a
′′
i ,
(a′′i1, . . . ,a
′′
i j−1,ai j,a
′′
i j+1, . . . ,a
′′
in)º (a′′i1, . . . ,a′′i j−1,a′i j,a′′i j+1, . . . ,a′′in) ⇔ ai j º0 a′i j.57
We can also talk about a subject whose preferences satisfy certain monotonicity
concepts on some problems, but not others. For example, ºmay satisfy C-monotonicity
on D i, but not on D i′ .
In our experiment the main object of focus is º—how people choose across multiple
replicates of the same problem. Thus, we want º to be revealed truthfully. Azrieli et al.
(2018) show that this is true if (and, essentially, only if) º∗ satisfies R-monotonicity.
The argument is simple: Picking the º-most preferred ai on each i generates matrix
a, and any deviation a′ would lead to at least one row i on which ai Â a′i. Thus, a
R-dominates a′. If º∗ satisfies R-dominance, then the subject would never prefer
such a deviation. Thus, we assume R-monotonicity throughout, but do not assume
any other form of monotonicity listed above. Justification for this comes from Brown
and Healy (2018), who show that monotonicity assumptions may be violated when all
decisions are shown on the same screen, but not when they are shown on separate
screens and in random order. In our experiment the decision problems are shown
on separate screens and in random order, so we expect R-monotonicity to hold. The
replicates, however, are all shown on the same screen, and so we may expect violations
57One could instead define C-monotonicity identically to R-monotonicity, mutatis mutandis, by first
defining a relation over entire columns and then requiring that this preference be independent of
what is chosen in other columns. This would be strictly stronger than our definition of C-monotonicity
because ours only applies to the special case where all rows are identical (which corresponds to the
case of only having a single decision problem).
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of other forms of monotonicity for º.
R-monotonicity is not innocuous, however. It forces a form of independence across
decision problems: if ai is chosen in row i, then it must be chosen regardless of what
was chosen in other rows.58
It is useful to highlight the relationships between the three dominance concepts
that apply to º.
Lemma 1. 1. º satisfies C-stochastic monotonicity⇒º satisfies C×Bn-monotonicity.
2. Suppose º0 satisfies B-monotonicity. Then º satisfies C-monotonicity ⇒ º
satisfies C×Bn-monotonicity.
3. Suppose º0 satisfies stochastic monotonicity. Then º satisfies C-monotonicity
⇒ º satisfies C-stochastic monotonicity ⇒ º satisfies C×Bn-monotonicity.
We are interested in studying mixing behavior, where subjects vary their choices
from one replicate to the next.
Definition 4. A subject exhibits mixing on decision problem D i if there exist repli-
cates j and j′ such that ai j 6= ai j′ .
The various notions of monotonicity of º rule out mixing behavior in different types
of problems.
Proposition 1. 1. If º satisfies C-monotonicity then the subject will never mix on
any decision problem D i = { f i, g i}, because they will always choose the option ( f i
or g i) that they prefer.
2. If º satisfies C-stochastic monotonicity then the subject will never mix on any
decision problem D i = { f i, g i} in which f i stochastically dominates g i, because
they will always choose f i.
58To illustrate, consider a subject facing D1 = {290,1} and D2 = {2100,1}, each two times (so m= n= 2).
Suppose his preferences are given by(
1 1
2100 2100
)
Â∗
(
1 290
1 2100
)
Â∗
(
1 290
2100 2100
)
Â∗
(
1 1
1 2100
)
.
This may be because he most-prefers to receive the safe option in exactly two states, but doesn’t care
which, but does prefer having 2100 in place of 290. Unfortunately this violates R-monotonicity since(
1 290
1 2100
)
Â∗
(
1 290
2100 2100
)
⇒ (1 2100)º (2100 2100)⇒ (1 11 2100
)
º∗
(
1 1
2100 2100
)
.
5
3. If º satisfies C×Bn-monotonicity then the subject will never mix on any decision
problem D i = { f i, g i} in which f i B-dominates g i, because they will always choose
f i.
In our experiment we do not offer decision problems with objects that are ranked
by B-dominance; thus, we do not test C×Bn-monotonicity separately from the other
two notions of monotonicity.
As a shorthand, we say that a subject has convex preferences if º violates the
relevant monotonicity concept. Subjects with convex preferences will exhibit mixing
behavior (choosing different options on different replicates) for at least some decision
problems.
D.3. Mixing and Random Preferences
An obvious explanation for mixing is that subjects simply have convex preferences,
meaning they fail to satisfy C-monotonicity (or C-stochastic monotonicity if the options
are ranked by stochastic dominance). An alternative explanation for mixing is that
subject’s preferences simply change from one choice to the next. We argue that
such behavior can persist even when C-monotonicity (appropriately re-interpreted) is
satisfied.
To formalize this claim, we adapt the framework of Azrieli et al. (2018, online
appendix). Specifically, we model preferences as being affected by some unknown state
θ ∈Θ. Information about θ is revealed before each decision is made; to capture this
simply, we let θ = ((θi j)nj=1)mi=1 and assume that at each decision i j the subject observes
θi j ∈ Θi j.59 The subject selects a plan s = ((si j)nj=1)mi=1, where each si j : Θi j → D i
indicates what the subject will pick for every possible θi j. A plan s therefore generates
an act that not only depends on r, c, and b, but also on the realized θ. The preference
º∗ is now defined over the space of such acts. R-monotonicity and C-monotonicity are
defined exactly as above, except now ai j is an act that depends on θ as well as b (it
lists what would be chosen for every θ). A plan s∗ is truthful if, at every i j and θi j,
s∗i j(θi j) is the most-preferred option in D i j, conditional on observing θi j. Preferences
on ai j are assumed to respect dominance, in the sense that ai j(θi j)º0 a′i j(θi j) for all
θi j implies ai j º0 a′i j.60
59To capture dynamic information revelation we think of θi j as including all information from all
θi′ j′ for which i′ ≤ i and j′ ≤ j.
60Here, ai j(θi j) ∈D i j is the constant act that pays the same gamble for all r, c, and θ, and abusing
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º0 \ º Convex Linear
Random RC RL
Fixed FC FL
Table XII: The general typology of subjects.
In this framework, C-monotonicity guarantees that the subject will report their
true favorite choices in each replicate, even as the information they observe about
their preferences changes from one replicate to the next (Azrieli et al., 2018). It does
not guarantee that choices will be identical across replicates, only that they will be
truthful. This gives our second explanation for mixing:
Observation 1. A subject with random preferences may mix in some decision prob-
lems even if they satisfy C-monotonicity.
Thus we have two general explanations for mixing: random preferences and a
failure of C-monotonicity (or C-stochastic monotonicity). For simplicity we say those
that satisfy monotonicity have linear preferences while those who fail it have conevex
preferences. We can thus type subjects into four categories, as shown in XII.
D.4. Mixing in The Sequential Treatment
We propose instead that the sequential treatment triggers myopic preferences. The
idea is that the subject faces a “current choice” and “future choices.” In SEQ the
current choice at each j is simple: pick between f i and g i. This choice is guided by º0
over f i and g i. The subject ignores future choices. In SIM there is only one “current
choice,” which is a choice over the entire vector ai. This is guided by º.
Formally, let C( j) ⊆ C represent those states in C that are still possible at infor-
mation set j, but not at information set j+ 1. In our SEQ treatment, C( j) = { j}
for all j. In the IND and SIM treatments the only information set is j = 1, so
C(1) = C. For each j, define º j as the subject’s preference over acts of the form
a ji = (ai j) j∈C( j) ∈ X C( j)×B
#C( j)
.61
Definition 5. Preference º is myopic if, for all information sets j, a ji º j a
j′
i then we
have ai º a′i.
notation, º0 also represents preferences over these acts.
61#C( j) denotes the number of states in C( j).
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This definition does not necessarily pin down the entire ranking º, but it does pin
down a most-preferred element. Specifically, if there are J information sets and a ji is
the most-preferred element at each j according to º j, then under myopic preferences
ai = (a1i , . . . ,aJi ) must be the most-preferred element according to º.
In SEQ C( j)= { j} for each j, so a ji = ai j and º j=º0. Having myopic preferences is
therefore equivalent to having preferences that respect C-dominance. In IND and
SIM, C(1)=C, so a1i = ai and º1=º. In those treatments myopic preferences place no
restriction whatsoever on º; the definition becomes vacuous.
The SIM treatment occurs after the SEQ treatment. It is possible that subject
learn to adapt myopic preferences in the SEQ treatment and apply them in the SIM
treatment that follows.
Subjects with random preferences will continue to mix in the SEQ treatment, as º0
changes from one information set to the next.
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E. EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
The following eight pages reproduce the experimental instructions given to subjects.
9
 OVERVIEW 
Welcome to our experiment. Thank you for participating! Before we begin, please turn off and put away 
your cell phones, and put away any other items you might have brought with you. If you have any 
questions during the instruction period, please raise your hand. 
This experiment consists of 4 different “blocks.” In each block, you’ll be asked to make a bunch of 
decisions. (The decisions are numbered, but will appear in random order. For example, you may make 
decision #7, and then decision #2, and so on.) Your choices in one block will not affect your choices in 
the other blocks; the four blocks are completely independent. We’ll go over instructions at the start of 
each block. Your screens will also give instructions, and you’re free to refer back to the printed 
instructions at any time.  
At the end of the experiment, one of the decisions will be randomly selected for payment. In each 
decision we will describe how that decision gets paid if it is selected. 
In addition to being paid for one decision, you will also receive a $5 participation payment for 
completing the experiment.  
 
  
BINGO CAGE BETS 
 
We have a Bingo cage filled with 20 balls, numbered 1-20. 
In each question in this block, you will be offered two “bets” on which ball is drawn from the cage. We’ll 
actually draw a ball from the Bingo cage 20 times, and you’ll choose 20 bets, one for each draw. (After 
each draw we’ll put the ball back into the cage before the next draw.) In each decision you must choose 
between Bet A or Bet B, both of which will be shown on your computer screen. Here is an example of 
two bets you might be given: 
 
Payment: 
If one of these questions is chosen for payment, we’ll draw a ball from the Bingo cage 20 times. We’ll 
then roll a 20-sided die to determine which of the 20 draws to pay out. We’ll then look at which bet you 
chose for that draw, and pay you based on that draw. 
For example, suppose the 20-sided die roll comes up “3”. That means we’re paying you for the bet you 
chose on the 3rd draw of the ball. Suppose you chose Bet B, shown above. Bet B pays $25 if the ball is 1-
16. 
If the 20 draws from the Bingo cage are 
5, 3, 11, 5, 20, 8, 4, 9, 1, 15, 9, 9, 11, 2, 18, 12, 5, 8, 12, 10 
then the 3rd draw is 11. You chose Bet B, and Bet B pays $25 for ball 11, so you’d actually be paid $25.  
If the 20-sided die had come up “5” then we’d pay for the 5th draw, which is 20. In that case Bet B would 
only pay $5. 
If you had chosen Bet A then you’d receive $15 regardless of what ball is drawn. 
The actual bets offered may be different than this example, and you’ll make several choices like this. 
Read the description of the 2 bets carefully each time before making your 20 choices. 
 
 
 
GAMES AGAINST PAST PLAYERS 
 
In these questions, you will play a “matrix game” against 20 people who participated in this experiment 
on some prior date. 
On the screen we will now demonstrate how “matrix games” work. 
In this block, you will be the ROW player and the past participants were COLUMN players.  
 
ROW player choices: 
You will actually play each game 20 times. For each of your 20 choices we will randomly draw one of the 
20 past participants, and your choice will be paired against that past participant’s choice. But you won’t 
know which past participants you’re paired with in each choice until the end of the experiment. 
Before you make your 20 decisions, we might give you some information about what all 20 past 
participants chose. For example, we could tell you that of the 20 past participants, 12 chose Left and 8 
chose Right. This information will appear on your computer screen. 
Payment: 
If one of these games is chosen for payment, we’ll use draws from a Bingo cage to see which past 
participant is associated to each of your 20 choices (putting the ball back after each draw), and then 
we’ll roll a 20-sided die to see which of those choices is paid out. We’ll compare your Row choice to that 
person’s Column choice and pay you your payoff in the game for that Row and Column. (The Column 
player will not be paid; they were paid when they played this game previously.) 
  
GAMES AGAINST CURRENT PLAYERS 
 
In these questions, you will play a “matrix game” against one of the 20 other people in the room today. 
On the screen we will now demonstrate how “matrix games” work. 
In this block, you will play each game as the Column player and as the Row player. You’ll actually 
proceed through 5 “Stages” of decision-making, numbered Stage 0 through Stage 4. We’ll explain each 
now: 
 
“Stage 0:” COLUMN player choice: 
In Stage 0 you will play the game 1 time as the COLUMN player. Here is an example game: 
 
 
“Stage 1:” ROW player choices: 
In Stage 1 you now play the same game, but as the ROW player. And you’ll play it 20 times. For each 
choice we’ll randomly draw the ID of another person in your room, and they will serve as the Column 
player if that choice is chosen for payment. For example, if your 3rd choice is against Column Player #17, 
then your 3rd Row choice will be compared to Player #17’s Column choice from Stage 0. 
 
 
 
 
Here is an example screenshot of your 20 choices: 
  
Payment: 
If Stage 1 is chosen for payment, we’ll randomly select one person in the room to be our Row player. 
And then we’ll use draws from a Bingo cage to select the identity of the Column player for each of their 
20 choices (putting the ball back after each draw). Finally, we’ll use a 20-sided die to see which choice is 
paid out. That Row player and Column player will get paid based on how they played (the Row player is 
paid for their Row choice against that particular Column player, and the Column player is paid based on 
their Column choice from Stage 0.) 
Everyone else in the room will receive a fixed payment of $15.  
 
“Stage 2:” Probabilities: 
In Stage 2 we want to know how likely you think it is that Column players play “Left” in this game. One 
way we could do this is to ask you the following list of 100 questions: 
 
In each question, you’d pick either Option A or Option B. Presumably you’d want Option A in the first 
few questions, but at some point would switch to taking Option B. So rather than telling us your choice 
to all 100 questions, we can just ask you to tell us at what percent chance you’d switch. And that “switch 
point” is exactly where you’re indifferent between Option A and Option B, because that switch point 
would be exactly at the probability that you think the Column players are choosing Left. 
Q#  Option A  Option B 
1 Would you rather have $20 if COLUMN chose Left or 1% chance of $20 
2 Would you rather have $20 if COLUMN chose Left or 2% chance of $20 
3 Would you rather have $20 if COLUMN chose Left or 3% chance of $20 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
99 Would you rather have $20 if COLUMN chose Left or 99% chance of $20 
100 Would you rather have $20 if COLUMN chose Left or 100% chance of $20 
For example, suppose your switch point is 73%. That means you’re indifferent between getting $20 if 
COLUMN plays Left, and getting $20 with 73% chance. But if you’re indifferent between those choices, 
then you must think COLUMN is playing Left 73% of the time. In other words, your switch point is exactly 
your probability that they play Left. 
How would you be paid if Stage 2 is chosen for payment? You enter your probability that the Column 
player plays left (for example, 73%). Then we draw one of the 100 questions above and see what you’d 
choose on that question. If it’s #1-72 then you chose Option A. So we’d pay you $20 if a randomly-
selected Column player actually chose Left in Stage 0. If the question drawn is #73-100 then you chose 
Option B. So we’d pay you $20 with the probability given in that row. (For example, if we pick question 
#83, then you’d get $20 with an 83% chance.) 
We’ll use two 10-sided dice to pick which row is actually chosen. If you choose Option B then we’ll use 
another roll of the two 10-sided dice to determine whether you win the $20 or not. (For example, if the 
chosen row is #83, then you’re getting an 83% chance of $20. That means we’ll pay you $20 if the 
second roll comes up 1-83.) 
Obviously you have an incentive to announce your “true” probability that you think the Column player is 
playing Left. If you misreport your true probability then you’ll end up choosing an option you like less on 
some of the rows above. 
Here is an example screenshot of this decision: 
 
 
“Stage 3:” Row player with a Hint 
In Stage 3 we’ll show you a “hint” of how an actual Column player played today. Here’s how the hint 
works: 
First, the computer will randomly select 1 of the other 20 players. The computer knows whether this 
player chose Left or Right as COLUMN player, so the computer can give you a hint about which they 
chose. The hint will either say “Left” or “Right”, but it’s not very accurate; the hint will be correct 55% of 
the time and wrong 45% of the time.  
This means that if you see the hint that COLUMN chose Left, then it’s slightly more likely that the 
COLUMN player really did choose Left. And if the hint says “Right” then it’s slightly more likely that the 
COLUMN player really did choose Right.  
After you see this hint, you will play the game 20 more times as the ROW player, each time matched 
with a randomly-drawn person in the room, just as you did back in Stage 1. The only difference is that 
you’ve now seen a hint. 
 
“Stage 4:” Probabilities with a Hint 
In Stage 4 we’ll once again ask you your probability that a random Column player chose Left. The 
payments will work just like in Stage 2. Again, your incentive is to report your belief truthfully. This is 
exactly as in Stage 2; the only difference is that now you’ve seen a hint.  
 
You will play 2 matrix games in this block. In each game you will go through all 5 stages (0 through 4). 
Notice that the games’ payoffs may be different, but the procedures for each stage are exactly the 
same. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
INVESTMENT QUESTIONS 
In the investment questions, you will be given $10.00, and you can choose to invest any amount of that 
money in a risky project. The money you don’t invest you keep for yourself. 
The project can either be a success or a failure. 
If it’s successful then the amount you invested in it will be multiplied by some number and paid to you. If 
it’s a failure then that money will be lost.  
In either case you get to keep the money that you chose not to invest. 
Your screen will include detailed instructions about these questions, so read the information carefully. 
Here is an example screenshot: 
 
 
You will face two different investment choices, each with a different chance of success and multiplier. 
Please read the screen carefully before making your choice each time. 
 
